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Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title
By David Frisch,* Fairfax Leary, Jr.,** and John D. Wladis***

GENERAL PROVISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The 1986 Annual Survey described the "check it back to local law" approach
to the Code's choice of law rules. 1 Recent cases emphasize this. For example, in
*Mr. Frisch is a member of the Rhode Island bar and associate professor of law at the Delaware
Law School of Widener University.
**Mr. Leary is a member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and District of Columbia bars and
Distinguished Senior Professor of Law at the Delaware Law School of Widener University.
***Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and associate professor of law at the Delaware
Law School of Widener University.
Patricia F. Mell of the Delaware Law School of Widener University prepared the portion of the
survey on Contract Formation and Terms: Unconscionability. John R. Hobbs, adjunct professor at
Seton Hall University School of Law, prepared the portion of the survey on Contract Formation
and Terms: Warranties, with the assistance of Lawrence B. Hunt, who prepared the subtopic on
Notice of Breach to Remote Sellers or Manufacturers.
Don L. Baker and Fairfax Leary, Jr., are co-chairmen of the Subcommittee on General
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title. Subcommittee members are: Anthony
Adams, Peter A. Akes, Marvin E. Barkin, John P. Bermingham, Bernard D. Broeker, Donald R.
Cassling, George M. Cheever, Kendall B. Coffey, Calvin Corman, David C. Corujo, James J.
Cunningham, Lanny J. Davis, Richard W. Duesenberg, Robert W. Foster, Roy N. Freed, Henry
C. Friend, David Frisch, Joseph J. Gazzoli, Eugene M. Harrington, Steven L. Harris, William D.
Hawkland, Keith J. Hey, Donald R. Hobbs, John 0. Honnold, Jeffrey A. Horwitz, Edwin E.
Huddleson, Kathleen A. Hurren, Lawrence B. Hunt, Daniel E. Johnson, Alvin G. Kalmanson,
Dennis S. Kayes, Robert A. Lester, J. Michael Lindell, Ann Lousin, Susan M. Mann, John D.
Meader, Patricia F. Mell, D. Kent Meyers, David L. Mitchell, John E. Murray, James L. Parrish,
Leo J. Pircher, Harris P. Quinn, Peter C. Quittmeyer, Jeffrey L. Raney, Herbert Rubin, Frederick
W. Runge, Jr., Alan R. Sachs, Linda D. Sartin, Jerome E. Smyth, Gerald Solk, Alphonse M.
Squillante, Michael .D. Strohbehn, John L. Utz, Victor A. Vilaplana, William R. Waddell,
William J. Wellman, Robert T. Williams, and John D. Wladis.
The authors would like to acknowledge the excellent assistance of Kevin Vitelli, third-year law
student at the Delaware Law School of Widener University, in the organization and preparation of
this survey.
Editor's note: All citations to the U.C.C. are to the 1978 Official Text, unless otherwise noted.
t. See Frisch, Leary, & Wladis, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions,
Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 41 Bus. Law. 1363 ( 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Annual
Survey].
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Madaus v. November Hill Farm, lnc.,2 the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia applied the Virginia pre-Code conflict of laws rules to a
dispute between a West German seller of a horse and a Virginia buyer. The
court applied the Virginia rule that the law applicable to the validity of a
contract is the law of the jurisdiction where the final act necessary to make the
contract binding was done. Since this was the sending of a telex from West
Germany, under the "mail box" rule, the contract was formed in West Germany and its law applied. 3 Equally, since delivery took place in West Germany,
that law also governed performance.
In Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Manufacturing Co., 4 the court ruled
that the Mississippi tort conflict of laws rules applied to indemnity claims based
on breach of warranty, as well as common law indemnity claims. On this basis,
the court applied what it called the Mississippi "center of gravity" test, which
seems not to vary too much from the more general "most significant relationship" test of section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 5 Since
the case involved the installation of a vinyl liner in a swimming pool in
Mississippi, the court ruled that Mississippi law applied despite the fact that
the liner was fabricated in Illinois by the third-party defendant from materials
produced in Ohio by B.F. Goodrich Co., fourth-party defendant.
Interestingly, one of several factors considered by the court was the state of
development of the rules of both common law indemnity and indemnity for
breach of warranty. Mississippi's rules were thought to be more developed. 6
The court also considered the ease of determining and applying the law. Since
the court and the attorneys were located in Mississippi, this factor also pointed
to Mississippi as the center of gravity. 7
On the other hand, in Price v. Litton Systems, 8 the Fifth Circuit remanded a
case for district court determination of whether Mississippi law or Alabama law
2.
3.
4.
5.

630 F. Supp. 1246, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 24 (W.D. Va. 1986).
Id. at 1249, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 28.
634 F. Supp. 1480, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 775 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 ( 1971) provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own
state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice or the applicable rule or
law include
(a) the needs or the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies or the forum,
(c) the relevant policies or other interested states and the relevant interests or those states
in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection or justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field or law,
(r) certainty, predictability and uniformity or result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application or the law to be applied.

6. 634 F. Supp. at 1485, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 782.
7. Id.
8. 784 F.2d 600, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1614 (5th Cir. 1986).
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applied in a suit based on manufacturing defects in night vision goggles, which
were the alleged cause of a helicopter crash that caused the death of two
wearers.
Starting its analysis of the tort claims with the statement that "[a)t least six
states have contacts with this litigation,''9 the court affirmed the application of
the .law of Alabama-the place of the accident-to the tort claims. The warranty claims received a different treatment following a Mississippi Supreme
Court ruling that the "center of gravity" could vary depending on the issue
being considered. 10 The Price court concluded that a claim based on breach of
warranty "arises in large part under the U.C.C. and not under general tort
theory." 11 The court was immediately faced with a Mississippi non-Code
statute, which provided that privity was not required to maintain actions for
personal injury, property damage, or economic loss on any of three theories,
including breach of warranty. 12 It also faced a Mississippi nonuniform amendment to the U.C.C. section 1-105(1) choice of law rules, providing that the law
of Mississippi
shall always govern the rights and duties of the parties in regard to ... the
necessity for privity of contract to maintain a civil action for breach of
implied warranties of merchantability or fitness notwithstanding any
agreement by the parties that the laws of some other state or nation shall
govern the rights and duties of the parties. 13
The court remanded the case for the district court to determine the constitutionality of applying Mississippi law to the case, since Mississippi's sole contact
was its status as the forum state. 14 Also, on remand the district court was to
separately address which state's law should govern the breach of warranty
claims. 15
9. The states were Mississippi (forum), Alabama (place of accident), California (place of
design), Virginia (place of manufacture), New Jersey (place of execution of contract of purchase),
and Texas (domicile of decedent).
10. Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1985).
11. 784 F.2d at 607, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1621.
12. Miss. Code Ann.§ 11-7-20 (Supp. 1986).
13. Id.§ 75-1-105(1) (1972).
14. 784 F.2d at 607, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1622.
15. Id. at 608, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1622. The court concluded by citing:
See, e.g., Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 577 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1978) (Texas
wrongful death statute held to govern negligence and strict liability in tort claims; Florida
wrongful death statute held to govern breach of warranty claims); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore
Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969) (court applied place of injury rule to the tort claims and
U.C.C. § 1-105 choice of law rule to warranty claims; court held Georgia law governed both
sets of claims). (Footnotes omitted.)

A footnote listed many other such cases. Also, in the Whitaker case on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit's
special concurrence asserted that U.C.C. § 1-105 only applied when a provision of the U.C.C. was
dispositive, otherwise a state's general conflict of laws rules applied. 424 F.2d 549, 550-51 (5th Cir.
1970).
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Thus, some courts seem able to apply an issue by issue approach to what
state's law governs, despite the reference in U.C.C. section 1-105( 1) to the
relationship between the law of a state and the transactions. Yet, in view of the
confusion on the proper treatment of warranty claims, with two courts reaching
different results under the law of the same state, the overall result is not the
best. Thus, conflict of laws is not an area in which uniformity in result or
prediction of result is made easier by the Uniform Commercial Code.

HYBRID SALES AND SERVICE CASES
The dreary litany of cases applying the so-called "predominant purpose test"
to contracts involving some service elements continues. Five of the eight cases
examined involved a statute of limitations question. The U.C.C. section 2-725
four-year statute was not always the one applied, although it did prevail in four
cases, ranging from the sale of a routinely assembled farm machinery shed, 16 to
the sale and assembly of a heat pump, 17 to the assembly, installation, and sale of
sprinkler systems and irrigation towers, 18 to the design, sale, and assembly of
steel producing services. 19 Services were held to predominate in a contract for
the application of herbicides by airplane in view of the selection of that method
of application over hand spraying, trailer spraying, and other means. 20 In one
case, the issue was whether a warranty of workman-like performance existed in
a contract to supply and install roofing. There was no such warranty. 21 Despite
the general abolition of privity under the U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to permit a direct suit against a
subcontractor for breach of a warranty of workman-like performance. 22
Notwithstanding that a contract to print a magazine is considered a service
contract where there was a course of dealing with open price terms, the court
applied U.C.C. section 2-305 by analogy to find that the printer's charges were
equivalent to the reasonable price at the time of delivery. 23
16. Bob Neiner Farms, Inc. v. Hendrix, 141 Ill. App. 3d 499, 490 N.E.2d 257, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 634 ( 1986 ).
17. Meeks v. Bell, 710 S.W.2d 789, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1118 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986).
18. 0.0.M. Farms v. Nakamoto, 718 P.2d 262, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1680 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1986).
19. Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1319 (7th Cir. 1986).
20. Grossman v. Aerial Farm Serv., 384 N.W.2d 488, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 362
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
21. Manor Junior College v. Kallers, Inc., 352 Pa. Super. 310, 507 A.2d 1245, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 648 (1986).
22. "We too are compelled to conclude that since there was no privity of contract between
appellant and Spencer [subcontractor] and since this case does not involve the U.C.C. or Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, appellant cannot proceed directly against Spencer for
breach of an implied warranty." 352 Pa. Super. at 318-19, 507 A.2d at 1249, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d at 650.
23. Printers II, Inc. v. Professionals Publishing, 615 F. Supp. 767, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Thus, the predominant purpose test does not provide a bright line, as it is not
based on a cost of goods or other cost analysis, but is a judgment call as to the
contract's predominant intent. Out of this analysis, courts are apt to evoke that
which they most want to find. 24

OTHER STATUTES AFFECTING ARTICLES 2 AND 7
An unrepealed Kentucky pre-Code statute came as a surprise to the form
drafters in Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Krieger25 and probably will surprise drafters in other states where such a statute may exist. Seller's reference to
the terms and conditions on the reverse side of its acknowledgment form was
below seller's signature on the form. Hence, the court ruled that all the fine
print on the reverse, including condition no. 22 (an exclusion of consequential
damages), fell below the signature and was not a part of the agreement under
Kentucky's interpretation of a statute providing that a writing "shall not be
deemed to be signed unless the signature is subscribed at the end or close of the
writing. " 26
The plaintiff counterclaiming for breach of implied and express warranties,
in L. Harvey & Son Co. v. jarman, 27 failed to show a breach of either type of
warranty because of its failure to comply with North Carolina's fertilizer
statute. In any damage action, the statute requires evidence, by analysis of a
sample, that the fertilizer did not conform to the composition requirements of
the statute, unless the Commissioner makes one of three statutory findings. 28
Since there had been no compliance with the statute, the counterclaim was
dismissed.

24. See In re Germane Publication Society, 289 F. 509, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (similar statement
by Learned Hand, J. ).
25. 710 S.W.2d 869, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 46 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
26. R.C. Durr Co. v. Bennett Indus., 590 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting K.R.S.
§ 466.060(1)); Bartelt Aviation v. Dry Lake Coal Co., 682 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
27. 76 N.C. App. 191, 333 S.E.2d 47, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 107 (1985).
28. N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 106-662(e)(4) (1978) reads:
No suit for damage claimed to result from the use of any lot of mixed fertilizer or fertilizer
material may be brought unless it shall be shown by an analysis of a sample taken and
analyzed in accordance with the provisions of this Article, that the said lot of fertilizer as
represented by a sample or samples taken in accordance with the provisions of this section does
not conform to the provisions of this Article with respect to the composition of the mixed
fertilizer or fertilizer material, unless [the Commissioner finds that the manufacturer has
engaged in specified prohibited activity].
The three possible findings of prohibited behavior by the manufacturer are (i) employment of
ingredients prohibited by the statute in other goods sold in the state, (ii) offering for sale during that
season of any kind of dishonest or fraudulent goods, or (iii) violation of any provision of the statute
by the manufacturer or any of its representatives or employees. In Potter v. Tyndall, 22 N.C. App.
129, 205 S.E.2d 808, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 661, 207 S.E.2d 762 (1974), the court held that the
statute did not apply when there are false statements that constitute an express warranty of fitness.
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In Abraham v. Volkswagen of America, lnc., 29 the Second Circuit ruled that
plaintiffs could not be included in the "100 named plaintiffs" required for a
class action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 30 Their claims either
arose in states still requiring privity for a suit in contract against a manufacturer31 or were barred by a time or mileage limitation in an express warranty~
The time limit was applicable even where the manufacturer knew of the defect
at the time of sale. 32 The ruling also required that two joint owners be counted
as one.
In remanding the case, the court directed the parties to confer and stipulate
on the named plaintiffs to be eliminated within ten days; it also ordered that
plaintiffs be given the same opportunity to seek and name new plaintiffs that
plaintiffs would have had if the class had been certified and the number of
named plaintiffs had then been reduced to seventy-five.
In re Great American Veal, lnc. 33 required the court to determine the effect of
a special trust fund (created by the Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, as
amended, 34 for unpaid cash sellers of livestock) on claims held by the unpaid
sellers and a secured creditor of the packer to whom they had sold. A complication was that the operations of the packer had been taken over by a large unpaid
consignor of the packer but no funds were paid for the takeover. Since the
consignor had not complied with the requirements of U.C.C. sections 2-326 or
9-114, the secured creditor of the packer to whom the livestock had been sold
prevailed.
But the court stated that the more important issue was "the validity and
priority status of the federal statutory lien asserted by" 36 the secured creditor,
which had purchased rights making it the subrogee of the unpaid cash sellers.
The bankruptcy court refused to apply the usual tracing rules to the secured
creditor as subrogee and held that in both its capacity as successor to the claims
of the unpaid cash sellers and its secured creditor capacity, it had priority over
the claims of the consignor.

29. 795 F.2d 238, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 681 (2d Cir. 1986).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982); id.§ 2310(d)(3)(C) (named plaintiffs must number at least
100 to maintain class action).
31. 795 F.2d at 249 n.12, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 689 n.12 (listing Illinois, Indiana, New
York, Ohio, and Wisconsin as those states still requiring privity).
32. The plaintiffs relied on Alberti v. General Motors Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1985),
which held that plaintiffs had valid express warranty claims, without regard to when the breakdowns occurred, if the manufacturer knew of the defects at the time of sale. The Abraham court
rejected the Alberti analysis as improperly confusing express and implied warranties. 795 F.2d at
250, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 690.
33. 59 Bankr. 27, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 565 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
34. 7 u.s.c. § 196(b) (1982).
35. 59 Bankr. at 32, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 572.
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THE INTERACTION OF TORT AND CONTRACT:
ECONOMIC LOSS
Many cases involve factual patterns potentially creating at least three causes
of action: negligence, strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and breach of warranty. Grant Gilmore, when alive, used to
suggest that a lawyer suing for breach of warranty when suit could be brought
in negligence or strict liability should, perhaps, be considered insane. 36 He
preferred actions in tort, where there was no (i) requirement of prior notice
within a reasonable time after the defect should have been discovered, 37 (ii) fouryear statute running from the date of delivery, 38 or (iii) ability to make
contractual disclaimers of warranty and limitations of damages. 39 Yet, the courts
seem bent on carving out a separate niche for products liability and warranty
based on the type of damages involved. On June 16, 1986, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica DeLaval lnc.,4° entered
the fray. Although the case was in admiralty and any tort would be a maritime
tort, the scope and thrust of the opinion applies in other settings. First, the court
joined with other authorities in recognizing a cause of action called products
liability, including liability based on negligence and strict liability, as a part of
general maritime law. 41
The case involved suits in tort by charterers of vessels in which defendant
DeLaval had installed turbines that were defective in design and installation,
but the only damage was to the product itself and to the vessels' propulsion
system. 42 The opinion states that whether injury to the property itself could be
recovered in tort "has spawned a variety of answers," none of which are found
either in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or in the Uniform Commercial

36. Professor Leary remembers conversations in which this was frequently said using the word
"certified."
37. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). The penalty for not giving notice is to be barred from any remedy.
38. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1), (2). A discovery rule applies only if two preconditions are satisfied:
First, the warranty must explicitly extend to future performance; and second, discovery of the
breach must await that future performance.
39. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (warranty disclaimers),§ 2-718 (liquidated damages), and§ 2-719 (the
exclusion or limitation of damages).
40. 106 S. Ct. 2295, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986).
41. Id. at 2299, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 614 (citing Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d
98, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1945) (products liability based on negligence), aff'd on other grounds, 328 U.S.
85 (1946); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th
Cir. 1977) (strict liability and adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)); Ocean
Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1984) (strict
liability)).
42. The opinion states that "there was no damage to 'other' property. Rather, the ... defectively
designed turbine components damaged only the turbine itself." Id. at 2300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
at 615. Where the defect is in a separately purchased component part of an installed unit, the court
ruled that recoverable property damage must be to property other than the unit serviced by the
component part. Id. (citing Northern Power and Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d
324, 330 (Alaska 1981)).
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Code. 43 The Court, referring to "landbased solutions," indicated that the poles
were represented by the majority or California position (where a defective
product causes only monetary damages, warranty law preempts the field) 44 and
the minority or New Jersey position (allowing tort recovery for injury to the
product itself whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm). 45
In a footnote, the Court recognized that each pole had taken a step toward the
other. It cited New Jersey's decision in Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford
Motor Co., 46 discussed in the 1986 Annual Survey, limiting Santor to consumer
cases, and a 1979 decision in California recognizing a cause of action for
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage! 7 But the Court
rejected intermediate positions, seeking to differentiate between, for example,
"the disappointed users" and "the endangered ones," 48 or the nature of the
defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose! 9 The Court
was also not persuaded by the majority of the courts of appeal sitting in
admiralty, which had taken the Santor position, because those cases concerned
fishing vessels and relied on solicitude for fishermen, an attitude "at times"
shared by Congress. 50
The Court found the intermediary and minority landbased positions unsatisfactory where no person or property is damaged other than the product itself,
since the losses, repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits are "essentially the
failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the
core concept of contract law." 61 The minority view, said the Court, "fails to
43. 106 S. Ct. at 2300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 616. In note 3, the court cited Wade, Is Section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the U.C.C. and Therefore Unconstitutional?,
42 Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974). The Delaware Supreme Court has taken the position that§ 402A of
the Restatement may not be applied in cases involving sales even where a resulting fire damaged
other property. Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 461 (Del.
1980).
44. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 2 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 15 ( 1965). Five decisions during the survey period followed the California
position. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 42 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1319 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinois law); 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotox
Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1608 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying South
Carolina law); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 S.W.2d 431, 42
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 100 (Minn. 198S); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist
& Derrick Co., 714 S.W.2d 919, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1246 (Mo. 1986); Johnson v.
General Motors Corp., 349 Pa. Super. 147, S02 A.2d 1317, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 8Sl
(1986).
4S. Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. S2, 207 A.2d 30S, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv.
(Callaghan) S99 (196S).
46. 98 N.J. SSS, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1184 (198S); see 1986
Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 1378.
47. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, S98 P.2d 60, 1S7 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
48. See, e.g., Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Ore. S87, S9S, S7S P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978).
49. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 6S2 F.2d 116S, 1173 (3d Cir.
1981).
SO. East River Steamship Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 2301 n.S, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 617 n.S.
SI. Id. at 2302, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 618.
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arcount for the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages."s 2
This last statement of the Court reaches the core of the matter. There is no
need to keep products law and warranty separate, but there is a need to keep
separate rules of law serving sound public policy. According to the Court, the
need is to prevent tort law from eroding the protections to producers and sellers
arising from the contractual ability to restrict liability (within limits) by
disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies.s 3 Having said that, the Court then
discussed warranty recovery as permitting recovery of lost profits and did not
mention the widespread use of clauses excluding recovery of consequential
damages. It stated that a commercial setting generally does not involve large
disparities in bargaining power.s• Earlier in the opinion, the Court commented
that when such losses occur, "the commercial user stands to lose the value of the
product, risks the displeasure of its customers ... or, as in this case, experiences
increased costs in performing a service. Losses like these can be insured. "SS
The real policy question is whether it is socially more efficient to place the
loss where the cost of insurance will have a preventive effect and will give an
incentive to test before producing, to produce with care, and to limit the asserted
purposes that a product may serve. 56 Placing the burden of insurance on
ultimate users may be counterproductive. 57 First, "chance takers" will not
insure and will reduce prices. The loss from a bad product may also be
catastrophic to a small retailer who has to compete with the chance takers to
survive. Second, the division between economic/monetary loss and personal
injury loss will not result in much premium saving to manufacturers, since the
verdicts supposedly causing the present alleged insurance crisis are the large
personal injury verdicts to which section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts will still apply, as well as U.C.C. section 2-719(3), with its prima facie
unconscionability rule for disclaimers of consequential damages involving personal injuries. Since defective products causing personal injury will also cause
damage to the product itself, is the court suggesting that there must be two
separate causes of action? Where vertical privity remains, in contract but not in
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2303, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 620. Due to the availability of insurance, would it not
be better policy to require expert testimony on current insurance cost and coverage in allocating
losses? Is separate insurance available for nonpersonal injury products liability and for products
liability causing personal injury?
54. Id. The Court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) at
this point, thus indicating that cases involving consumer contracts may receive a different treatment.
But what of fishing boats and fishermen? See supra text accompanying note 50. The implication is
that these cases should no longer be followed.
55. 106 S. Ct. at 2302, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 619.
56. Professor Leary was present at hearings before the House and Senate during consideration
of what ultimately became the Magnusson-Moss Act. The statement in the text was the policy
asserted by congressional committee staff members and congressional sponsors of the act.
57. The smaller the amount of the policy, the greater the per-dollar cost of insurance. Also, the
gathering of statistics to permit actuarial calculation of risks and the fixing of premiums would be
more difficult.
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tort, must the damages be itemized so that only the tort damages may be
asserted against remote manufacturers? 58
Perhaps the problems cry out for a proper legislative solution 59 that is fair to
product users, product sellers, and product makers. It should also apply to all
product liability situations, abolishing any distinctions inherited from the formulary writ system, such as between contract and tort. 60

ARTICLE II-SALES OF GOODS
CONTRACT FORMATION AND TERMS
Statute of Frauds
No decisions of great significance appeared in connection with the application
of the statute of frauds bar to enforcement, but precedent on the proper solutions
to some problems is growing.
Triangle Marketing v. Action Industries 61 awarded judgment on the pleadings where the writing pied by the plaintiff was its unsolicited purchase order,
which did not confirm an oral contract and to which no response had been
made. The court ruled that there was no requirement that the matter await the
completion of discovery in the hope that defendant would make an admission. 62
58. One should remember that East River Steamship Corp. was brought in admiralty and
involves only what the court determined to be injuries to the product itself. Perhaps nothing further
should be drawn from the decision.
59. In footnote 3, the Court referred to legislation only in Congress, stating in part:
When S. 100, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985) (the Product Liability Act) was introduced, it
excluded, § 21(6), recovery for commercial Joss. Suggestions have been made for revising this
provision. See Amendment 16, 131 Cong. Rec. 3183 (March 19, 1985); Amendment 100, 131
Cong. Rec. 6090, 6091 (May 14, 1985 ). Other bills also have addressed the issue. See S. 1999,
131 Cong. Rec. 18321 (Dec. 20, 1985); Amendment 1951, 132 Cong. Rec. 5764 (May 12,
1986). See also H.R. 2568, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 4425, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1986).
Strangely, no mention is made of the numerous State Product Liability Laws, of which there
were 24 at last count. See Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705 F.2d 164, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1494 (6th Cir. 1983) (Michigan's products liability statute applies to warranty claims).
60. Great Britain does not necessarily agree that separate functions must be preserved for tort
and contract law. See Headly, The Myth of Waiver of Tort, 100 Law Q. Rev. 653, 678 (1984):
A classification of actions that arose in the early nineteenth century is not necessarily a firm
basis for judicial policy in the late twentieth century. It is still true (though to an increasingly
limited extent) that "the forms of action ... rule us from their graves," but this is an
unavoidable necessity, not an ideal to be emulated. (Footnote omitted.)
The quotation is from F. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 2 n.20 (1936). See also
Cane, Physical Loss, Economic Loss and Products Liability, 95 Law Q. Rev. 117 (1979); Fridman,
The Interaction of Tort and Contract, 93 Law Q. Rev. 422 ( 1977); cf Wallace, Tort Demolishes
Contract in New Construction, 94 Law Q. Rev. 60 (1978).
61. 630 F. Supp. 1538, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 36 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
62. The claim that the motion must await the completion of discovery was based on the provision
in U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b), satisfying the statute of frauds if there is an admission of the contract in a
party's pleadings or otherwise. But where there is a denial of the contract, the plaintiff should at
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This demonstrates a touching faith in the observance of the rule that an attorney
will not deny an allegation without evidence to support the denial. The case
supports a minority view.
In another case, an Arizona court63 found conduct indicating acceptance of an
order for building materials in that the supplier's price quotation was used in
the purchase order, the order was picked up by the supplier's people at the
buyer's office, delivery schedules were discussed, and the employees involved
admitted that they believed they had conveyed a message of acceptance to the
buyer by reason of a long course of prior dealings. The court concluded that
"ordinary people do not speak 'legalese.' They do business. Their conduct
implies the legal conclusion." 64
The court quickly found the statute of frauds to be satisfied based on the
absence of an objection to the purchase order confirming an oral understanding
of the previous day, the existence of internal memoranda in the seller's office
ordering the goods, the preliminary notice of lien filed by the supplier, and the
testimony of the seller's agents that the order had been accepted. Nonetheless,
on orders of the Phoenix branch of Owens Corning, its retail branch cancelled
the contract. 65
Cases for tortious interference with contract show that attorneys should not
litigate on such obviously wrong bases, even when hard pressed by recalcitrant
clients who have wrongfully cancelled an order. This case was for tortious
interference with contract, as well as breach of contract. The jury awarded
least provide some credible support for a belief that discovery, limited to the statute of frauds issue,
would produce the necessary admission or a sufficient writing. Discovery instituted to produce a
settlement offer should not be tolerated. Prior cases are divided on this issue.
While neither party in Triangle cited cases, the court's law clerk found a number. Denying
judgment on the pleadings before discovery were Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 4, 147 S.E.2d 374,
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 296 (1966); M.& W. Farm Serv. Co. v. Callison, 285 N.W.2d
271, 275-76, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1239, 1243-44 (Iowa 1979); Franklin County
Coop. v. MFC Servs. (A.A.L.), 441 So. 2d 1376, 1378, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1465,
1467-68 (Miss. 1983); Reissman lnt'l Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1165, 1167-68 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378, 15
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 765, 768-69 (N.D. 1974). Cases permitting a judgment were
Simmons Oil Corp. v. Bulk Sales Corp., 498 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.N.J. 1980); Presti v. Wilson,
348 F. Supp. 543, 545, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 716, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Boylan v.
G.L. Morrow Co., 63 N.Y.2d 616, 468 N.E.2d 681 (1984). The last case was a memorandum
decision of five judges despite a lengthy dissent.
The Garrison line of cases would make sense if the rule were that when a party asserts the
statute of frauds to prevent enforcement, a limited discovery would be allowed if requested by the
other side and restricted to the statute of frauds issue. Then, if no admission is obtained, dismissal
would follow without waiting for trial. It is only when discovery covers all other issues that a
defendant is subjected to the very litigation the statute was designed to prevent, an argument the
Triangle court used to justify no discovery at all.
63. Custom Roofing Co. v. Alling, 146 Ariz. 388, 706 P.2d 400, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 63 (Ct. App. 1985).
64. Id. at 390, 706 P.2d at 402, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 64.
65. Id. at 389, 706 P.2d at 401, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 64. Custom was not an "approved
contractor" for direct purchases from the manufacturer but had for many years been buying its
requirements from the manufacturer's retail outlet, not through the regional branch office.
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$105,000 in punitive damages, and, after a remittitur of compensatory damages,
the judgment was affirmed. 66
Where the sale is by auction to be offered in bulk and later sold in parcels,
with ultimate title going to whichever method produces the most money, can the
successful bidder for the bulk withdraw before completion of the parcel bidding? In United States v. Conrad, 67 the court was faced with a highest bulk
bidder who sought to withdraw his bid while the sale by lots was in progress.
To his plea of the statute of frauds, the court ruled that in making a memo of
the knockdown to the highest bidder and in signing it, the auctioneer's clerk
acted as agent for both buyer and seller. The court also ruled that the sale was
final when the hammer fell with a condition precedent to performance that the
bulk bid be higher than the total of the parcel bids. 68
In Global Truck & Equipment Co. v. Palmer Machine Works, 69 the oral
discussions covered twenty-five trailers for hauling washed rock and gravel, but
the only writing was a purchase order for five. The seller testified that there
were only export permits and funding for five and that the buyer had merely
indicated orally an intent to contract for an additional twenty at a later date. 70
When the deal aborted, the suit could only cover the five trailers, as the quantity
stated in the writing could not be exceeded. Nor did any of the exceptions help
since the suit was by the buyer for failure to deliver and defective delivery.
There was no admission by the party to be charged of a contract for twenty-five,
nor delivery and payment. The first exception for specially manufactured goods
applies only to protect the seller. Some members of the subcommittee wonder
why the objective criteria needed to prove this exception should not be equally
available to a buyer. 71
While speaking of the exceptions, one case more has ruled that the exception
to the statute of frauds applied to goods delivered to and accepted by a
"noncontractual" third party. 72 Stated baldly, the proposition may go too far
and may too readily enable the debts of the actual recipient to be foisted off on
another. Here, however, the invoices were made out to the defendant, were hand
delivered, and were accepted without evidence of any objection. It seems that
testimony should have been allowed with this objective corroboration.
In two cases under U.C.C. section 2-201(2), 73 the issue was whether a farmer
is a merchant; both cases held in the affirmative. The Nebraska court pointed
66. Compensatory damages of $30,000 were reduced to S14,000 in the trial court before
judgment.
67. 619 F. Supp. 1319, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 424 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
68. Id. at 1322-23, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 429.
69. 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
70. Id. at 647, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1258.
71. The objective nature of evidence of commencing work on special materials or special designs
should be equally persuasive that a contract existed when suit is brought by the buyer.
72. Dykes Restaurant Supply v. Grimes, 481 So. 2d 1149, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1603 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).
73. Thunderbird Farms, Inc. v. Abney, 178 Ga. App. 335, 343 S.E.2d 127, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 360 (1986) (doctor owner had incorporated farm to keep it separated from his
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out that Nebraska's nonuniform change excluding certain sellers of their own
crops from the merchant coverage of U.C.C. section 2-201(2) 74 was not in effect
at the time of the transactions and so was not applicable.
Two cases correctly took the position that a failure to respond to a confirmatory memorandum did not bar a trial on the defense of no contract. 75 In one of
these two, Spinnerin Yarn Co. v. Apparel Retail Corp., the court applied the
statute of frauds provision of U.C.C. section 1-206 to the sale of a business that
was largely personal property.
Seminole Peanut Co. v. Goodson 76 ruled that uncertainty as to price in the
writings did not preclude a contract because, for statute of frauds purposes, only
a quantity term need be stated and the conduct of the parties evidenced a
sufficient intent to have an open price contract. The court also ruled that,
despite full performance by the peanut growers, they could still sue for damages
for fraud in inducing them to make the contract. 77
In other litigation, a party claimed that because the contractual relationship
arose out of a settlement agreement terminating a nonmarital relationship, t~e
statute of frauds did not apply to its modification. 78 The claim was not successful, even though unusual.
Equitable estoppel raised its ugly head in one case. Renfroe v. Ladd7 9 arqse
under U.C.C. section 8-319 and the court reiterated its holding in a prior C<l:Se
under U.C.C. section 2-201 that to permit equitable estoppel as to the statute of
frauds would be a judicial amendment of the statute. It is difficult to explain the
holding in light of U.C.C. section 1-103's specific mention of estoppel as a
supplementary rule of law.

Unconscionability
Unconscionability is but one method of policing sales agreements between
parties. 80 An ancient concept, 81 unconscionability is codified in section 2-302 of

medical practice); Agrex, Inc. v. Schrant, 221 Neb. 604, 379 N.W.2d 751, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1213 (1986) (owner regularly marketed grain and followed market).
74. 6 Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. § 2-201(2)(b) (1980), added by 1963 Neb. Laws 544.
75. Spinnerin Yarn Co. v. Apparel Retail Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1174, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (U.C.C. § 2-201); Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 200
Conn. 172, 510 A.2d 972, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1298 (1986) (U.C.C. § 8-319).
76. 176 Ga. App. 42, 335 S.E.2d 157, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 74 (1985).
77. Id. at 45-46, 335 S.E.2d at 160, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 78.
78. LaRosa v. Fortier, 492 So. 2d 425, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callagpan) 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
79. 701 S.W.2d 148, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 547 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (action under
U.C.C. § 8-319 relying on cases under U.C.C. § 2-201).
80. Fraud, misrepresentation, warranty liability, and various statutory protections afforded by
such acts as the State Retail Installments Sales Acts, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, all provide protection to an unwary buyer in the
marketplace. See generally J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (2d ed. 1980).
81. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82,100 (Ch. 1750).
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the Code. 82 In applying its provisions, most courts follow the proceduralsubstantive unconscionability dichotomy developed by Professor Leff. 83
While consumers have brought most of the successful cases against merchants
under section 2-302, merchants can likewise benefit from the section. By
reliance on section 2-302, merchants can avoid the operation of substantively
unreasonable contract terms where the relative bargaining power, economic
strength, or the availability of alternative sources of supply unduly favors the
other party.
The ability of merchants to recover under section 2-302 is illustrated by the
Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Cantos, lnc. 84 In
Gianni, a small manufacturer in the apparel industry successfully challenged
the cancellation clause in the buyer's standard form purchase contract. The
challenged clause reserved the buyer's right to terminate, by notice, any purchase orders submitted to the seller either prior to shipment by seller or prior to
an untimely delivery. 85 The trial court made several findings supporting both
substantive and procedural unconscionability. The findings were based upon a
marked disparity in both the ~elative bargaining power and economic strength
of the parties and the absence of an alternative market for plaintiff's goods.
Substantive unconscionability arpse from the nature of the garment industry
itself: The "big sharks" are able to impose such clauses because small independent manufacturers such as plaintiff have no clout to demand otherwise.
Procedural unconscionability arose from plaintiff's testimony that he had not
read the clause and would not have entered into the contract if he had. For these
reasons, the trial court held the clause unenforceable. The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision per curiam. 86
Unconscionability pft!':n arises where one party to a contract seeks (i) to
disclaim either the impli!'!d warranties 87 of fitness for a particular purpose 88 or
merchantability89 or (ii) to limit liability for consequential damages. 90 Despite a
82. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
( 1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
83. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485
(1967).
84. 151 Mich. App. 598, 391 N.W.2d 760, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1433 (1986).
85. Id. at 600, 391 N.W.2d at 761, 1 l/.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1436.
86. Id. at 604, 391 N.W.2d at 763, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1436.
87. U.C.C. § 2-316 requires that a disclaimer of implied warranties be either conspicuous and
use the word "merchantability" or use words that clearly indicate that no warranty exists.
88. Id. § 2-315.
89. Id. § 2-314.
90. Id. § 2-719.
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historic disdain for enforcing such disclaimers and limitations where a personal
injury is involved, 91 an injured consumer was denied relief when he was shown
to have understood the contract well enough to modify some of its other terms
and to have understood the risks inherent in purchasing the product by virtue of
his education and special training. In Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 92 the
defendant sold the parts and machinery necessary to construct small passenger
airplanes. The plaintiff was an expert woodmaker who constructed airplane
propellers. While he specifically modified several of the terms of defendant's
form contract, there was no evidence that he attempted to modify the terms of
defendant's limitation of liability language. 93 Plaintiff made a thorough investigation of the product before purchasing it and was a member of the Associates
Flying Club and the Experimental Aircraft Association. Given these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit found the disclaimer provision of the contract to be
conscionable and, therefore, enforceable against the consumer. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit reversed this portion of the lower court's decision. 94
Many courts have recognized the applicability by analogy of article 2 to
transactions not involving the sale of goods. Two cases this year are worthy of
mention: John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 95 an equipment leasing case, and
Best v. United States National Bank of Oregon, 96 a class action by consumer
depositors of a bank challenging the conscionability of nonsufficient funds
charges assessed against their bank accounts.
john Deere Leasing involved an adhesion contract in which elements of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability were established. The lease agreement between the parties entitled the lessee to exercise an option to purchase the
equipment at a predetermined price only. at the termination of the lease period.
Despite this limitation, the lease gave the lessor the right to claim as damages
upon default of the lessee not only the amount remaining due on the lease plus
interest but also the option-to-purchase price of the equipment. These default
provisions were in light-colored fine print on the back of the lease. This fine
print was illegible because the darker print on the front side of the lease showed
through to the back. While the lessee admitted to having signed the front of the
lease, he denied having read the back. He testified that he assumed that he was
91. Id.§ 2-719(3).
92. 797 F.2d 845, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1540 (10th Cir. 1986).
93. The pertinent disclaimer language read as follows: "Buyer expressly waives any and all
claims arising from structural integrity, performance, flight characteristics, mechanical failures, and
safety against QUICKIE AIRCRAFT CORPORATION." Id. at 848, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at
1549.
94. The finding was not a total bar to the consumer's recovery. The plaintiff argued and the
court agreed that if one or more theories of liability were preserved, despite the disclaimer provision,
the jury's verdict and the court's judgment with respect to those issues should not be challenged.
Since no authority was found for plaintiff's assertion that strict product liability claims could not be
destroyed by disclaimers of the type presented, the court remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to certify this question to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 852, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d at 1550-51.
95. 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 658 (D. Kan. 1986).
96. 78 Ore. App. I, 714 P.2d 1049, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 6 (1986).
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entering into the usual lease with an option contract and that he did not expect
to be liable for the purchase price should he default.
Lessee defaulted after making two payments on the lease. Since the lease had
not yet expired, the option to purchase the equipment had not matured and
could not validly be exercised by defendant. The lessor repossessed the equipment, sold it, and claimed the above amounts as damages under the terms of the
lease.
Under these circumstances, the federal district court found both procedural
and substantive unconscionability and, therefore, refused to enforce the lease
default provision. The court premised its finding of procedural unconscionability on the defendant's lack of knowledge and the involuntary nature of his assent
at the formation of the contract. The court found substantive unconscionability
because the promisor had imposed a penalty on the lessee for terminating the
lease and failing to exercise the option.
Best is unique because plaintiffs attempted to use the historically defensive
provisions of section 2-302 in an affirmative challenge to the bank's allegedly
exorbitant charges for processing nonsufficient funds checks. Plaintiffs argued
that the charges were a penalty assessed against bank customers who wrote
checks on nonsufficient funds, thereby breaching their eontracts with the bank.
Plaintiffs accordingly requested restitution of those amounts. The Oregon Court
of Appeals held that while there was a genuine issue of fact as to the bank's
good faith in assessing charges that greatly exceeded the bank's processing costs,
section 2-302 does not provide the basis for affirmative relief.

Battle of the Forms
Courts seem to try to make U.C.C. section 2-207 do a lot more than Karl
Llewellyn ever dreamed of in developing his philosophy. Dean John Murray
has recently characterized the results as the "Chaos of the Battle of the
Forms." 97 He leans toward rewriting the section.
But perhaps much can be done to improve the situation if courts would apply
a few ancient, but prescient, rules to the Code and not try to force U.C.C.
section 2-207 as a solution in all matters involving an exchange of forms.
Following Lord Coke's maxims, expressed in Heydon's Case, 98 the first inquiry
should be into two things. First, identify the "mischief . . . for which the
common law did not provide [a remedy]," 99 and second, identify precisely the
remedy "the Parliament hath resolved." 100 And it is suggested that all of the
expressed underlying policies of the Code should also be considered. 101
97. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1307 (1986).
98. 3 Co. Rep. 7b, 637 (1584). Also relevant is Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowden 459, 465 (1573),
referring to rules of law as composed of both words and spirit and requiring application in
accordance with the spirit.
99. 3 Co. Rep. 7b, at 638.
100. Id.
101. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(1), (2)(a), (b), (c). The definition of "agreement" in U.C.C. § 1-201(3) is
based on "the bargain of the parties in fact" (emphasis added). Throughout the sections in parts 2
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Had the Ninth Circuit panel in Diamond Fruit Growers v. Krack Corp. 102
pursued this approach in Krack Corp.'s claim for indemnity against its suppliers, the result might have been drastically different on at least two possible
alternatives. One of these approaches would have involved judicial legerdemain
instead of a rather complete judicial rewrite of the section. 103
Before the court was a case involving a refrigeration unit manufactured by
Krack using a tubing coil made by Metal-Matic. An undiscovered or later
developed pinhole caused an ammonia leak, which damaged Diamond's fruit
while held for storage. Apparently there was no disclaimer of the warranty of
merchantability, and suit was in a jurisdiction requiring a comparative negligence solution in indemnity cases. 104
Forms were exchanged as they had been for some years. 105 Krack sent a
purchase order to Metal-Matic with no provision concerning consequential
damages. Metal-Matic replied with an acknowledgment form containing a very
conspicuous reference to its terms on the reverse. Two were significant. One
tracked the "unless" clause with which the text of U.C.C. section 2-207(1)
concludes. 106 The other tracked U.C.C. section 2-719(1)(a), excluding all consequential damages and providing a limited repair, replace, or refund of the
purchase price limitation on damages recoverable. 107 Apparently, neither clause
was in Krack's form with the fruit wholesaler. The court held that the evidence
demonstrated that Krack's purchasing manager sometime before the particular
transaction had read the terms on the forms and had attempted unsuccessfully to
have the clauses removed, after which there was no further protest. 108

and 3 of article 2, there are references in the text and comment to "the intent of the parties," or what
the parties have intended. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) & comment (para. 3); id. § 2-202; id.
§ 2-305(1 ).
102. 794 F.2d 1440, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1073 (9th Cir. 1986).
103. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-207 puts the section in a position contra
to several fundamental Code policies. Note that U.C.C. § 2-207 indeed runs counter to several
fundamental approaches of the Code-particularly the "freedom of contract" principle, the right of
an offeree to make a counteroffer, and the general rule that consequential damages are not
recoverable unless so provided "in this Act or in other rule of law." See infra notes 112, 113, & 120
and accompanying text.
104. As between manufacturer and supplier, the consequential damages were allocated 70:30.
105. The exchange of forms here was a bit unusual. At the beginning of each year, Krack sent
Metal-Matic a form of purchase order setting forth its estimated needs for the coming year. There
was no reply. The parties agreed no contract was thereby made. Then, as tubing was needed, Krack
sent a specific order for a quantity on a definite delivery date and Metal-Matic responded on an
acknowledgement of order form.
106. Metal-Matic's form on the reverse side provided: "Metal-Matic Inc.'s acceptance of
purchaser's offer or its offer to purchase is hereby expressly made conditional to purchaser's
acceptance of the terms and provisions of the acknowledgement form." 797 F.2d at 1441, 1 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d at 1074. At the bottom of the front of the form in bold face capitals was: "SEE
REVERSE SIDE FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE." Id.
107. Id. at 1442-43, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1076-77.
108. Id. at 1441, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1075. How many subsequent transactions there
were is not stated.
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The Ninth Circuit ruled that the exclusion of consequential damages was not
a part of "the contract" but apparently an additional proposal to the contract to
which there was no specific and express assent by Krack, who fired the "first
shot." Hence, the forms excluding consequential damages did not become part
of the contract. 109 The court was apparently convinced that the pre-Code
"mischieP' to be remedied by U.C.C. section 2-207 was the common law result
that favored the last shot. 110 It apparently felt that the appropriate remedy
should be an enforced application of the Code gap-filling provisions and damage
recovery rules, on the ground that such provisions were neutral to the differences between the "shots." Here, however, the court actually adopted a first shot
rule.
There is a total disregard of the grammatical reading of section 2-207(1 )'s
"unless" clause. The subsection states that a form "operates as an acceptance
... unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms." When the unless clause is used, the phrase-"operates as an
acceptance"-is negated. 111 Thus, we are dealing with a counteroffer, not an
offer and an acceptance with variant terms.
Nowhere does the Code expressly negate the effect of counteroffers in
rejecting and terminating an offer. 112 The policy of the Code on freedom of
contract, and hence freedom to make counteroffers, is set forth in U.C.C. section
1-102(3) and emphasized in comment 2 as stating "affirmatively at the outset
109. Id. at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1081. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) provides for exclusion of
consequential damages by contract and this right to contract out of liability is referred to in
comments to both the unconscionability and warranty sections, as well as in the comment to U.C.C.
§ 1-106. See U.C.C. § 1-102 & comment (referring to freedom of contract as a key principle).
110. 794 F.2d at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1080.
111. Indeed, it is also possible to construe the unless clause as modifying all that precedes it, thus
defeating the "Definite and seasonable expression of acceptance" clause. The court, however, said:
Further, in a case such as this one, requiring the seller to assume more liability than it intends
is not altogether inappropriate. The seller is most responsible for the ambiguity because it
inserts a term in its form which requires assent to additional terms and then does not enforce
that requirement. If the seller truly does not want to be bound unless the buyer assents to its
terms, it can protect itself by not shipping until it obtains that assent.

Id. at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1081. This truly shows the lengths to which a result-oriented
court will go to justify an improper result. First, the court maintained that following a procedure
dictated by the Code created an ambiguity. Then, it said that a failure to obtain a form of assent first
enunciated years later in this opinion, and reliance on continued dealing after a negotiation that
failed to remove the clause, supports a conclusion that the seller did not "truly" mean what the
grammar of the Code says the language meant. All of this is contra to the plain meaning of the rules
in U.C.C. §§ 2-204 and 2-206 that make a contract on the terms of the offer if followed by
acceptance of a shipment or other conduct indicating acceptance.
112. The purpose of the unless clause in U.C.C. § 2-207(1) was to permit a seller to make a
counteroffer if so desired, but the seller must do so explicitly. There is no indication that§ 2-207(1)
purports to change basic counteroffer rules where the unless clause is used. For the proposition that
common law rules prevail in the interstices of the Code, see G&R Corp. v. American Security &
Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 33 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Goldstein v.
S&A Restaurant Corp., 622 F. Supp. 139, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 81 (D.D.C. 1985).
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that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code." 113 What then was the
"mischief' that section 2-207 was designed to prevent? It was the unintended
counteroffer effect under common law 114 where a reply expressing acceptance
had only minor differences from the offer; that is, suggestions or terms that in
business dealings did not, and in business thinking ought not, result in a
counteroffer, especially when the reply to the offer did not signal a counteroffer115 but contained a 'definite and seasonal expression of acceptance.
The Diamond Fruit court seems to suggest that shipment of the tubing by the
seller operated as a waiver of the condition altogether, 116 unless there was an
expressed definite assent to the term~ in the acknowledgment. 117 This is a new
limit on the rules for the acceptance of offers found in the Code, which opt
heavily in favor of acceptance by conduct. 118
Where the issue is the exclusion of consequential damages, one should not
talk of placing the buyer in as good a position as it would have been in had the
seller performed, 119 without mentioning the immediately follo\Ying clause of
section 1-106(1): "but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may
be had except as specifically provided in this Act qr by other rule of law. " 120
Also not mentioned by the court were the provisions of U.C.C. section
2-719(1)(a), expressly permitting a disclaimer of consequential damages, and
section 2-719(3), indicating that where personal injuries are not involved, one
claiming unconscionability would have to show that the exclusion was unconscionable.121 If U.C.C. section 2-302 on that subject is the guide, then the
plaintiff must overcome the comment's statement that His not the purpose of the
section to disturb the "allocation of risks because of superior bargaining

113. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 2. The section itself does preclude a disclaimer of "the obligations
of good faith diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act." Making a reply to an offer a
counteroffer and disclaiming consequential damages does not violate any of the specified obligations.
There are also specific exceptions to freedom of contract, as in U.C.C. § 9-501(3), and "fair
reading" exceptions, such as oral waivers of the statute of frauds, none of which apply here.
114. The object was merely to eliminate cases such as Poel v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co.,
216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915), where a clause asked for prompt acknowledgment of the
acceptance. The so-called "mirror image" rule.
115. Under the common law, an acceptance merely requesting a change was clearly not a
counteroffer. Restate~ent (Second) of Contracts§ 61 (1981). U.C.C. § 2-207(1) and (2) seems to
change the emphasis; the response is not a counteroffer unless the party says so by using the unless
clause.
116. Waiver coniemplates a relinquishment of a right by a person having at least reason to know
that the right exists and is being relinquished. See Barliant v. Follet Corp., 138 Ill. App. 3d 756,
483 N.E.2d 1312, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1206 (1985). Given seller's refusal to remove
the clause, and U.C.C. §§ 2-204 and 2-206, it is sophistry to find a basis for imposing a greater
liability than intended because the seller did not take "enforcement" procedures not required by the
Code.
117. 794 F.2d at 1445, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1080.
118. See U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206, 1-205, 2-207(3).
119. See id.§ 1-106(1).
120. Id.§ 1-106(1) (last lines).
121. See id.§ 2-713 comment 3.
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power." 122 The effect of liability for consequential damages on pricing is well
known. The Code appears to treat it as one of the risks to be allocated by
agreement, both in U.C.C. section 2-719( l)(a)'s statement that the "agreement
may provide" for exclusion of consequential damages, and in the reference to
that statement in comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-715: "Any seller who does not
wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available the section on
contractual limitation of remedy." Finally in comment 5 to U.C.C. section
2-207, among the examples of clauses that "involve no element of unreasonable
surprise and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice
of objection is seasonably given, [is a clause] otherwise limiting remedy in a
reasonable manner."
Was the remedy here limited unreasonably and, thus, may the court have
erroneously reached a proper result? By the terms of U.C.C. section 2-714,
damages for breach of warranty are the difference "between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted." We can assume that the value of tubing with a pinhole is zero, so
that a refund of the purchase price is what should be awarded under the Code.
Hence, the limitation is not unreasonable, as it follows the Code rule.
Thus, the Code seems to consider that who pays consequential damages is a
matter for contract allocation. A seller following the Code's provision on how to
make it clear that the acknowledgment form is a counteroffer should not be
forced to bear the risk of excludable consequential damages. This is especially
true where the damages are for the benefit of a buyer who knew the exclusion
was in the form and had not been successful in having it eliminated.
The Ninth Circuit could have taken a second approach in most cases,
although it would not have been appli'Cable in this case. This alternative flows
from the fact, emphasized in Dean Murray's article, that a very large majority
of purchasing agents do not read the conditions on the reverse sides of either
their own or the other contracting parties' forms. 123 Hence, neither party's terms
were called specifically to the attention of the other, including the unless
clause. 124 Thus, following a policy of implementing the intent of the parties, or
that contractual relations are based on a meeting of the minds, the court could
have applied U.C.C. section 2-207(3) as a fair resolution of the problem when
the goods are shipped and accepted, and no terms mutually agreed upon apply
to the problem. But this approach, too, should not be applied in favor of a party
who had read the reverse of the other party's form and had unsuccessfully
negotiated for removal of the exclusion of consequential damages, but who
nonetheless continued to accept and pay for goods shipped afterwards under the
same form. 126
122. See id.§ 2-302 comment 1 (discussion following citation of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948)).
123. See Murray, supra note 97, at 1317-18 n.47 (referring to the practices of some 5,000
purchasing agents}.
124. The "not called to the attention" technique is usually reserved for nonreading consumers.
125. Instead of a nonreader, the case involves a post-reading negotiator.
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Of course, the Code could have provided that the front of the form, to be
effective, must have a conspicuous reference to the fact that disclaimers of
warranties and of consequential damages were on the reverse side, 126 or that the
unless clause, to be effective, should be conspicuously stated above the signature
on the face of any acknowledgment. 127 But the Code did not take this route. Nor
did it specify that acceptances of counteroffers were to be made in any way
different from acceptances of offers. Judicial decision is not an appropriate way
to amend Code text. Nor should a court, in effect, find waivers of the unless
clause that are not knowingly made with intent to waive. 128
In contrast to the analysis of prior dealing in Diamond Fruit, an Illinois
appellate court in Barliant v. Follett Corp. 129 was faced with an invoice, issued
under an agreement for a sale of books F.O.B. seller's warehouse, Chicago,
adding charges for book post, transportation, and insurance. The court held that
under U.C.C. section 2-207(2) these terms were not material alterations to the
contract. The contract documents were, according to buyer-Barliant, the seller's
terms of sale in its catalogue and Barliant's order, including reimbursement of
the cost of transportation from the warehouse to the plaintiff's retail stores. The
suit claimed that the charges added were in excess of the costs to be reimbursed.
For more than eighteen months the added charges were paid in full on
twenty-four invoices by Barliant, an attorney, who testified that as a matter of
general management he examined invoices and packing slips before making
payment. 130 The trial court found "incredible" his testimony that he had not
noticed the increased nature of the charges, and it also ruled that he had
accepted them by a course of dealing. 131 It is not clear from the opinion whether
the invoices were treated as acceptances or whether the catalogue's terms were
such that the order was the acceptance. In any event, there was no need to rule
on the material alteration point. As proposals for addition to the contract, or as
modifications under U.C.C. section 2-209, they were accepted by a course of
dealing based on a reason to know. 132
Mace Industries v. Paddock Pool Equipment Co. 133 suggested a better approach in some ways but went too far in others. The court indicated that for a
return form to constitute a counteroffer, "the conditional nature of the accep126. It may be difficult to see why disclaimers of warranties require type that is conspicuous and
the use of the word merchantability, when limitations of damages do not. Yet, the plain meaning of
the Code's language makes this distinction, perhaps because the latter limitations so often occur.
Also, in comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-207, a reasonable limitation of damages is an example of a
nonmaterial term. Yet, a refund of the cost of a piece of tubing seems quite immaterial as compared
with damages to the fruit in a wholesale cooler, but courts should not reverse legislative decisions
plainly enacted.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26 (Kansas rule on signatures).
128. See supra note 116.
129. 138 Ill. App. 3d 756, 483 N.E.2d 1312, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1206.
130. Id. at 761, 483 N.E.2d at 1316, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1211.
131. Id. at 759, 761, 483 N.E.2d at 1314, 1317, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1_209, 1211.
132. See V.C.C. § 1-205.
133. 288 S.C. 62, 339 S.E.2d 527, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 825 (Ct. App. 1986).
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tance must be clearly expressed in a manner sufficient to notify the offeror that
the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless the additional or
different terms are included in the contract." 134 The difficulty is how to characterize the so-called "purchase order" containing no reference to warranties sent
in response to a "quotation" document called a "sales agreement" containing a
limited warranty and which was referred to in the purchase order.
The sender of the purchase order argued that it was a counteroffer accepted
by an acknowledgment that (i) did not limit warranties (thereby accepting all of
its terms and implications) and (ii) objected to only two of the conditions on the
purchase order. 135 This characterization of the purchase order as a counteroffer
was based on a statement on the reverse of the form, "THE SELLER
AGREES TO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS,'' and on a provision that the terms constituted the entire agreement of
the parties. The court ruled that, despite the objection of Mace to two of the
purchase order terms, Paddock was willing to go through with the agreement,
and that this demonstrated "that Paddock was willing to proceed with the
purchase of the equipment even though Mace did not assent to all the terms" of
the purchase order. 136 Even if correct, does not this reasoning demonstrate
treatment of the purchase order as an acceptance and not a counteroffer? This
treatment is probably correct since the expression of acceptance in the purchase
order, if there was one, was not expressly conditioned on a seller's agreement to
its terms.
Then, the court treated Paddock as accepting Mace's limited warranty, which
was only stated in the quotation sales agreement. If the purchase order was an
offer, did not the "conspicuous" language satisfy U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a)
and negate any terms in the seller's acceptance that were different or additional
to the offer? 137 The reference to the prior proposed sales agreement could have
been considered as an ambiguity resolved against the sender of the order.
It seems odd that where nothing about a warranty is stated in a purchase
order, or nothing as to exclusion of consequential damages, the provisions of the
Code are incorporated as objections to a reply, but when not stated in an
acceptance, the terms are not effective as objections to a limited warranty in the
offering documents.
Equally, it seems that in Diamond Fruit something more than proceeding
with the deal was needed for assent to a counteroffer, but in Mace, proceeding
with a deal was sufficient to constitute a withdrawal of a counteroffer.
Dean Murray is right. There is chaos in the battle of the forms. Perhaps the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Code should reconsider whether U.C.C.
section 2-207 provides the appropriate results intended.

134. Id. at--, 339 S.E.2d at 530, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 828-29.
135. Id. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 530, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 827.
136. Id. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 530, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 829.
137. True, the language does not object to specific terms one by one. But is this required in an
offer? Is the exact language of the unless clause necessary to create a counteroffer?
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Warranties
General
Again, the litigation on warranty issues was mostly routine, although a few
cases dealt with questions of interest. Several cases involving warranty issues
arose out of the sale of used automobiles. In Crothers v. Cohen, 138 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for Crothers based on a jury finding that
Cohen breached an express warranty made by Cohen's agent to Crothers. After
upholding the trial court's decision to submit the issue of the existence of an
express warranty to the jury, the court of appeals, relying on a line of cases
concluding that use of the word "good" created an express warranty, affirmed
the jury's finding that the statement that a 1970 Dodge had a rebuilt carburetor
and was a good runner was sufficient to create an express warranty, covering a
stuck accelerator that caused the car to crash into a tree and injure the plaintiff.
Yet, nowhere did the court explain just exactly how a warranty that a car is a
good runner covered a stuck accelerator. However, there were jury findings that
there was a breach, that the breach caused the accident, and that, in a
comparative negligence state, the plaintiff was five percent at fault and the seller
ninety-five percent.
'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Bailey v. LeBeau, 139 suspended its
own rules of appellate procedure to prevent what it termed a "manifest
injustice," 140 and created what the dissenting judge might have characterized as
the same thing. In Bailey, the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff under the
North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practice Act, 141 trebling damages of $2,200
and awarding attorneys' fees based on a warranty claim arising from the sale of
a Honda Civic. The appellate court noted that the uncontroverted evidence was
clearly sufficient to support a jury's finding (i) that the salesman's statement
that certain engine parts had been replaced within the last six months constituted an express warranty and (ii) that this warranty had been breached. But
the court remanded the case for a new trial, reasoning that there was no
evidence that the breach of the warranty (that parts had actually been replaced
about eighteen months before the sale instead of the six months warranted)
caused the failure that occurred. 142 One judge dissented, noting that (i) plaintiff
was assured that the car was suitable for effective and economical long-distance
driving, (ii) plaintiff paid $1,400 for a car that would not run, (iii) title and
possession of the auto was still in defendant, (iv) plaintiff was stranded 120
miles from home and had to get back the best way he could, (v) plaintiff
returned to get the car and tow it back, all at cost to himself, and (vi) plaintiff
138. 384 N.W.2d 562, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
139. 79 N.C. App. 345, 339 S.E.2d 460, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 378 (1986).
140. Id. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 462, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 381.
141. N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 75-1.1 (1977). Attorneys' fees could be awarded under id.§ 75-16.1. The
basis was willfully engaging in the deceptive act (lying about how recently the act was done and that
there was unwarranted refusal to resolve the matter). Plaintiff was "put off'' by claims of repair
work for over 45 days while no work was being done.
142. 79 N.C. App. at __ , 339 S.E.2d at 464, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 384.
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was deprived of the use of the auto during a delay of eighteen months. Since the
evidence established that plaintiff suffered out-of-pocket expenses, much inconvenience, lost time, and $1,400 for the car, Judge Phillips felt that rather than
waive rules for a deceptive defendant the law required that the judgment be
affirmed. 143
In Foley v. Dayton Bank & Trust, 144 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
dismissed a claim for breach of express warranty arising out of the sale by the
bank of a used truck it had repossessed. The court decided that a statement by a
bank employee that to the best of his knowledge the truck was in good condition
was merely an opinion that did not create an express warranty. Conversely, the
New York Justice Court in Bernstein v. Sherman, 146 held that the statement by
a private seller's mechanic that the frame of a Datsun 280Z that had recently
been in an accident was in good condition, created an express warranty, "at
least to the extent that the frame was in 'good condition,' " 146 even though the
bill of sale contained an "as is" clause. 147
Two cases dealt with express warranties arising out of sales where the seller
agreed to deliver goods in accordance with a buyer's required specifications. In
the first, Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer lndustries, 148 a panel of the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for Northern States based on a claim of
breach of an express warranty. The express warranty was found in the
technical specifications created jointly by buyer and seller and in the statement
in the proposal for a contract (that was accepted) that the items supplied would
meet the contract specifications. 149 In the second case, Phillips Petroleum Co.,
Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 160 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a
decision of the court of appeals and reinstated a verdict for Phillips Petroleum
for in excess of $1,600,000 for breach of an express warranty on reasons
different than those of the trial court. Here, the court found that an express
warranty had been created where Bucyrus-Erie's confirmation of a modification
in effect certified that crane pedestal adapters would be made of a specified
143. Id. at - - · 339 S.E.2d at 464-66, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d. at 384-87 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
144. 696 S.W.2d 356, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
145. 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 375 (Just. Ct.
1986).
146. Id. at 743, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 377. See also Redmac, Inc. v.
Computerland of Peoria, 140 Ill. App. 3d 741, 489 N.E.2d 380, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1242 ( 1985) (court affirmed an award for breach of an express warranty for Redman who relied on
statements that a computer system would be free of defects and would work for a reasonable period
of time; the computer never worked).
147. As to the consistency between the mechanic's statement and the as is clause, the court found
they were not necessarily inconsistent, and alternatively, that the "as is" disclaimer was invalid as
against public policy since the defect caused an accident from which the plaintiff was fortunate to
escape without serious personal injury. 130 Misc. 2d at 743, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 301, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d at 378. See also infra text accompanying note 156.
148. 777 F.2d 405, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1 (8th Cir. 1985).
149. See discussion of Northern States Power Co. infra text accompanying note 158.
150. 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 667 (1986).
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grade of steel as required by Phillips's specifications. This warranty was
breached when that grade of steel was inadvertently not used. 151
The question of whether reliance on an express warranty is a prerequisite for
a claim of breach was examined in several cases. In Keith v. Buchanan, 152 a
California appellate court reversed a judgment for defendant, rendered at the
close of plaintiff's case, where the buyer did not show any reliance on affirmations made in an advertising brochure disseminated to the public in order to
induce sales of an oceangoing yacht. In reversing the judgment for defendant,
the court held that actual reliance on the seller's factual representations in
advertising brochures need not be shown under section 2-313 of the California
Commercial Code. Rather, the seller must show that the representations formed
no part of the bargain. 153 In Global Truck and Equipment Co. v. Palmer
Machine Works,1 54 a federal court in the Northern District of Mississippi
denied recovery for breach of an express warranty arising out of the sale of
dump trucks by Palmer to Global, where Global failed to prove that statements
contained in the Palmer brochure were relied upon or induced the sale prior to
or contemporaneously with the making of the contract, 155 an approach directly
contra to that used in Keith.

Disclaimers and Limited Remedies
In Bernstein v. Sherman, 156 as discussed previously, the court held that a
written disclaimer in the form of an "as is" clause in a bill of sale was not
inconsistent with the seller's mechanic's statement that the frame of an automobile was in good condition. Alternatively, the court, upon the assumption of an
inconsistency, held the as is disclaimer invalid as contrary to public policy where
the defect had the potential to cause serious bodily injury. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Phillips Petroleum Co., Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 157 held
that a limited remedy for replacement of defective crane pedestal adapters failed
to make the injured party whole where the damages provided for were unconscionably low. Evidence established damages in excess of $1,600,000 and the
limited remedy provisions would have put a ceiling on plaintiff's damages at
$10,400.
151. See discussion of Phillips Petroleum infra text accompanying note 157.
152. 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 386 (1985).
153. The fact that the buyer had several boat builders inspect the yacht before purchasing it did
not negate the "basis of the bargain" requirement, but it did negate the reliance element a plaintiff
must show when claiming breach of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
154. 628 F. Supp. 641, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1250.
155. See Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1114 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (reliance is not a necessary element of a claim for breach of the implied
warranties of U.C.C. § 2-314 or§ 2-315). See also Bernstein v. Sherman, 130 Misc. 2d at 742, 497
N.Y.S.2d at 300, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 377; Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus.,
777 F.2d at 412, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 11.
156. 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 375.
157. 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 667.
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Finally, in Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Industries, 158 a panel of
the Eighth Circuit affirmed a decision of the district court holding that the
contractual disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies were inconsistent with an express warranty arising out of the acceptance of Northern States's
technical specifications. The court concluded that the disclaimers written in the
contract do not apply to a breach of the warranty of compliance with the
specifications. In particular, the court declined to rule that, as a matter of law,
the limited remedy in a separate paragraph referring to the warranties in that
paragraph was the sole remedy under the contract for breach of the express
warranty pertaining to the specifications.

Third-Party Beneficiaries

In Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 159 a Pennsylvania court applied alternative A to U.C.C. section 2-318 to deny standing to a widow who inherited a car
bought by her late husband and attempted to sue for damages (not involving
personal injury) as a third-party beneficiary. The court reasoned that section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was also inapplicable as the loss was
economic.
On the other hand, where vertical privity was concerned, the purchaser of a
warehouse who, by virtue of an assignment clause in the purchase contract,
succeeded to the buyer's rights, was able to defeat defendant's motions for
summary judgment in Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp. 160 Although the
twenty-year roofing bond had expired, summary judgment could not be granted
because question of fact existed as to whether the representations made in
connection with the roofing bond "were warranties extending to future performance."161

a

Notice of Breach to Remote Sellers or Manufacturers
Section 2-607(3 )(a) requires a buyer to give a seller notice of breach within a
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach.
Failure to give the specified notice bars a buyer from any remedy for breach.
The case law has not been uniform in its application of this section to remote
sellers and manufacturers. Some decisions have limited the section to require the
buyer to notify only his immediate seller of any breach. 162 These decisions allow
a buyer, who has given the necessary notice of breach to his immediate seller, to
then seek relief from remote sellers and manufacturers up the distribution chain
who may not receive any notice of the alleged breach until litigation begins.
158. 777 F.2d 405, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1.
159. 349 Pa. Super. 147, 502 A.2d 1317, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 851 (1986).
160. 503 A.2d 646, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 462 (Del. Super. 1985).
161. Id. at 656, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 471.
162. See, e.g., Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Sup. 219, 217 A.2d 71, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 147 (1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129,
2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 611 (1965).
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However, a recent case illustrates the apparent trend toward a more expansive
interpretation of the section that requires a buyer to notify all sellers or
manufacturers in the distribution chain of any breach for which the buyer may
seek relief.
In Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park,1 63 the Texas Court of Appeals held
that a buyer must notify a remote manufacturer of any breach in order to
recover. At trial, the jury found that the "sealer-type casket" that the manufacturer produced and sold to plaintiff's immediate vendor was unfit for its
ordinary purposes. The jury also specifically found that plaintiff had failed to
notify the manufacturer of the casket's unfit condition within a reasonable time.
The appellate court reasoned that the purpose of the mandated notice-to
afford an opportunity to inspect the goods and cure a breach-was as applicable
to remote sellers and manufacturers as to the buyer's immediate seller. 164
While the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the court of appeals
in Wilcox in a per curiam opinion, 165 it specifically refused to consider whether
the notice requirement of section 2-607(3 )(a) applies to remote sellers and
manufacturers, thereby contributing to the uncertainty surrounding this issue.
The court of appeals decision in Wilcox is a reminder, though, that buyers
cannot assume that their immediate sellers will bear the buyers' burden of
providing notice to remote parties and that the failure to give such notice can be
fatal.

PERFORMANCE
Creditors
The Third Circuit recently considered whether New Jersey would adopt the
subjective "pure heart and empty head" standard for determining good faith
purchaser status in Johnson b Johnson Products v. Dal International Trading
Co. 166 In that case, operating subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson obtained a
preliminary injunction as part of an effort to bar the distribution of Johnson &
Johnson products after the goods had worked their way into the so-called "gray
market." 167 Although the route by which the goods came into the hands of
defendant, Quality King, was unclear, their journey began when Dal International Trading Co., an instrumentality of the Polish government, acquired them
from Johnson & Johnson, Ltd., a British corporation. According to the plaintiffs, J & J, Ltd. sold to Dal only because of Dal's fraudulent representation that
the goods would be distributed solely in Poland. 168 The district court believed
163. 696 S.W.2d 423, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 169 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
164. Id. at 424, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 170-71.
165. 701 S.W.2d 842, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1303 (Tex. 1986).
166. 798 F.2d 100, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1082 (3d Cir. 1986).
167. As described by the court, the gray market is "where imported products are sold in the
United States outside the manufacturer's distribution system, often contrary to the wishes of the
manufacturer." Id. at 101, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1083.
168. Because the contract was fraudulently induced, the court correctly assumed that Dal
obtained voidable title.
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that Quality King was not a good faith purchaser under U.C.C. sections
2-403(1) and 2-103( 1) and, hence, acquired only the voidable title of Dal. 169
The court's conclusion was premised on its finding that the transaction was
conducted under "suspicious circumstances" that "cried out for inquiry." 170
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that whether Quality King was honest
in fact is to be determined by what it actually knew or suspected, not by what an
investigation into the facts would have arguably disclosed. 171 Stating that the
purpose of the good faith purchaser doctrine is the promotion of commerce by
the reduction of transaction costs, the court thought the doctrine would be illserved by the imposition on a purchaser of a duty to investigate the conditions
surrounding its transferor's acquisition.

Title and Entrusting
Executive Financial Services v. Pagel 112 raised the question of whether a
buyer who does not take free of an existing security interest under U.C.C.
section 9-307(1 )173 nevertheless can rely on the entrustment theory of U.C.C.
section 2-403(2) 174 to render his interest superior to that of the secured creditor.
In Pagel, the secured creditor purchased several tractors from a John Deere
dealership, then "leased" 176 the tractors to a partnership consisting of the two
principals of the dealership. The secured creditor expected that the partnership
would sublease the tractors to farmers, but instead, the tractors, which never left
the dealership's lot, were sold by the dealership in the ordinary course of its
business. Because the security interest was not created by the dealership, the
buyers did not qualify for the preferred treatment of U.C.C. section 9-307(1 ). 176
If their interest was protected, it could only be because of U.C.C. section 2-

169. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1 ): "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or
had power to transfer .... A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value."
170. 798 F.2d at 103, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1085 (citing district court opinion).
171. Although good faith on the part of a merchant requires both "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade," U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b),
only the first part of the definition received the court's attention. The district court did not find, nor
did the plaintiffs produce, evidence that it was the practice in the gray market to investigate the
chain of title. 798 F.2d at 106 n.4, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1090 n.4. Nor was there any
discussion of whether the failure to investigate was based on fear of what would be found, thus
negating good faith.
172. 238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d 381, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1185 (1986).
173. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) allows a buyer in the ordinary course of business to take free of a
security interest created by his seller.
174. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business."
175. Although the transaction was denominated by the parties as a lease, the court found that it
was actually a sale and the creation of a security interest.
176. It could possibly have been argued that the dealership was the alter ego or agent of the
partnership, thus making U.C.C. § 9-307(1) applicable.
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403(2). Adopting the view of Professor Barkley Clark, 177 the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the resolution of priority disputes between secured creditors and
subsequent buyers is not the exclusive domain of article 9. Where, as in this
case, the secured creditor is the actual entruster, its rights as such are tra:isferred to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
Although comment 2 to U.C.C. section 2-403 suggests that goods must
become part of a merchant's inventory before there can be an entrustment, it
does not follow that physical possession by the merchant is needed. Schneider v.
J. W. Metz Lumber Co. 11 s involved the sale of prefabricated log cabin kits. The
lumber was provided by a wholesale lumber company and delivered directly to
the buyers of the kits. However, it was the log cabin company that was solely
responsible for paying the wholesaler. When the log cabin company filed for
bankruptcy without having paid the wholesaler, the wholesaler sought recovery
from the buyers. In reversing both the trial and intermediate appellate courts,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the effect of the wholesaler's delivery to
the buyers was an entrustment to the Jog cabin company. 179 As a result, the
buyers had no difficulty qualifying for buyer in ordinary course treatment under
U.C.C. section 2-403(2).

Tender, Cure, and Notice
Few cases of any interest were decided on the issue of tender. 1so In one
involving the running of a bankruptcy time period (now repealed), the court
held that the period started when delivery was tendered. 1s1 But, as the court
said, the repeal of the section made its holding of little precedential value. 1s2
Seller's right to cure a defective tender arose in a revocation of acceptance
case, 1s3 which did not discuss or mention the recently adopted "lemon law." 1s•
Whether the car was a new car (it was a "demonstrator" with 2,915 miles on it)
was not an issue, since the Renault was sold with the AMC limited new car
warranty. Also, unlike the "same defect" three times requirement in the lemon
laws, many of the numerous returns were for more than ten different defects,
with one return requiring a wait of twenty-two days for parts. The trial judge
177. B. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code§ 3.4[3)
(1987 Cum. Supp. No. 1). The act of entrustment was the secured creditor's acquiescence in what it
believed would be the temporary retention of possession of the tractors by the dealership. See U.C.C.
§ 2-403(3).
178. 715 P.2d 329, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1648 (Colo. 1986).
179. Id. at 333, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1651.
180. One case is discussed infra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
181. Production Steel, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 54 Bankr. 417, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1285 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985).
182. Id. at 419 n.1, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1289 n.1. The 45-day period in 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(2)(B) (1982) had been eliminated by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 355, 378.
183. Rester v. Morrow, 491 So. 2d 204, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 751 (Miss. 1986).
184. The Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, Miss. Code Ann.§§ 63-17-151 to 63-17165 (Supp. 1986) (effective July 1, 1985).
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granted the dealer's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the buyer
had not shown that any substantial defects remained unrepaired. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded by a vote of six to one. Accepting
the subjective standard to determine "the unique circumstances of the buyer"
but placing a reasonable man in those circumstances, the court ruled that "our
law does not allow a seller to postpone revocation in perpetuity by fixing
everything that goes wrong with the automobile." 185 At the final rejection, the
buyer referred to three minor defects that were still unrepaired. 186 But the court
said that emphasis on these defects only concentrated on the "straw [that broke]
the camel's back. In our view, the whole camel-including its performance over
the five month period [of plaintiff's] use of the Renault-is relevant to the
question of whether [plaintiff] had a right to revoke." 167 The dissenting judge
did not enter an opinion, stating in a footnote that the case "has been in the
bosom of this court far too long." 166
Tr/:r S Brass r/:r Bronze Works v. Pie-Air, Inc. 169 involved an installment sale
of door handles made with tooling supplied by buyer and a defective third
installment that was rejected for nonconformity. Buyer did not return the goods
after rejection but was entitled to keep the goods until it was paid the cost of
inspecting and sorting the conforming from the defective products. 190 The
handles were made available at buyer's facility, constituting no acceptance or
waiver of the right to reject. Seller refused to acknowledge responsibility to cure
until past the time for performance. This not only Jost seller the right to cure
but also rendered seller liable in conversion for failure to return the tooling on
demand. The buyer's acceptance of the first two shipments was asserted as the
basis for seller's belief that the third installment was acceptable and that seller
had a further reasonable time to cure. The failure to give any notice of intent to
cure forfeited the reasonable time and the failure to give notice of intent to cure
destroyed the defense to conversion of the tooling as no notice was given by the
bailee that retention after a demand for return was to enable fulfillment of the
purpose of the bailment. 191
Two cases, however, protect the seller's right to cure. Where the buyer failed
to state particular defects and refused to permit seller to inspect the defective
185. 491 So. 2d at 210, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 759.
186. These were soiled carpet (from water leaking on it), a fallen fuse panel, and a missing piece
of chrome. Id. at 208, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 759.
187. Id. at 210, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 760.
188. Id. at 212 n.1, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 762 n.1 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The car was
purchased in April 1981 and the opinion remanding for a new trial on all issues was rendered in
June 1986. Justice delayed is justice denied.
189. 790 F.2d 1098, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 433 (4th Cir. 1986).
190. U.C.C. § 2-603( 1), requiring a rejecting buyer to follow reasonable instructions, is subject
to U.C.C. § 2-711(3), giving the buyer a security interest in the rightfully rejected goods for
payments made and expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care,
and custody.
191. 790 F.2d at 1106, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 444. Under neither the common law of
bailments nor the U.C.C., had Pie-Air shown a right to retain the tooling.
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goods, buyer was not allowed to rely on these defects as a defense to a suit for
the purchase price. 192 The court based its denial on U.C.C. section 2-605, which
has three bases for precluding the assertion of unstated defects. The first is that
the defects must be ascertainable by reasonable inspection. The second and third
are in the alternative (but one must be shown), either that the defect could have
been cured, as in the case under discussion, or (as between merchants) that a
written demand for a full and final inspection has been made and is answered.
The second case involved a rejection of one installment of concrete sewer pipe
for failure to meet buyer's specifications. 193 There was a prompt shipment of
cure with fully complying pipe. Buyer attempted to cancel the entire contract
since the supplier also had been obliged to cure prior defective shipments. The
buyer also attempted to recover for excess costs in ordering cover. Because the
supplier covered promptly and within the time for delivery of each installment,
the court refused a subjective test for "substantial impairment" under U.C.C.
section 2-612(2) and reversed the judgment below, which had awarded the
buyer the costs of cover.

Risk of Loss
Only one case discussed risk of loss as a major issue. In Ladex Corp. v.
Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A.,1 94 frozen shrimp was to be sold by a
Honduras company to Ladex in Miami. The shrimp arrived at Miami International Airport and were turned over to a trucking firm for delivery to Ladex's
warehouse. The court then observed that "although the facts are somewhat
sketchy on the record before us, we perceive that the truck containing the
shipment of shrimp was hijacked while still in the loading area of the airport. "195 Suit was brought by Aetna Insurance Company (as subrogee of Ladex)
for common law conversion against the carriers. The carriers contended that
since Ladex had never paid for the shrimp, it had suffered no loss. On this basis,
the trial court entered a final summary judgment for the carriers.
A Florida appellate court reversed on the ground that the all-important issue
was whether Ladex had title to the shrimp at the time they were hijacked. 196
Thus, despite the rule of U.C.C. section 2-401-that the provisions of the Code
apply irrespective of title to the goods-courts still are swayed by concepts of
title. The real problem was, when did risk of loss pass to the buyer? This was
governed by U.C.C. section 2-509(1) and depended on whether the contract was
a shipment contract or a destination contract-without regard to title. Carrier
liability for common law conversion may still depend on title, however.
192. A.F.L. Falck, S.p.A. v. E.A. Karay Co., 639 F. Supp. 314, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
193. Bodine Sewer, Inc. v. Eastern Ill. Precast, Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 920, 493 N.E.2d 705, 1
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1480 (1986).
194. 476 So. 2d 763, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
195. Id. at 764, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 134.
196. Id. at 764, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 135.
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The court correctly ruled that the fact that Ladex had not paid for the goods,
if title had passed, was not an issue available to the carriers in a common law
conversion action under U.C.C. section 1-103. Yet, the court noted that if the
action had been for nondelivery by the consignee of a nonnegotiable bill, U.C.C.
section 7-301 would limit recovery to one who has paid value. 197 In dicta, which
may be the law of the case, the court stated that a contract C.l.F. or C & F is a
shipment contract on the normal contract terms that are so well known that any
variation using those letters should be read as a shipment contract, if reasonably
possible. A destination contract was the variant contract and must be expressly
agreed upon by the parties. 198 But since the record was not fully developed on
the type of contract (again referred to in the context of determining who had
title as a matter of law), the case was remanded for further proceedings.
The court does not make clear who had rights of recovery if title passes
contractually under U.C.C. section 2-401 at a different time from the risk of
loss under U.C.C. section 2-509( 1).

Repudiation
Despite the fact that the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation is well over a
hundred years old, courts appear reluctant to permit suit on that basis without a
very clear refusal by a party to perform. Hence, to obtain a clear repudiation,
use is made of the demand for assurances in U.C.C. section 2-609(1 ). But its
requirements that the demand be in writing, be based on reasonable grounds for
insecurity, and be for "adequate" assurances only create issues as to whether the
failure to reply, or what is offered in reply, really triggers a repudiation.
Seldom are the facts as clear as those before the court in BarclaysAmerican/
Business Credit v. E & E Enterprises. 199 On July 16, 1982, a seller of wood
products informed the buyer /cabinet maker that it was closing its plant that day
and would not deliver under two purchase orders for delivery in July and
August. The seller added that the only way to receive the deliveries was to talk
to the vice president of Barclays, which was the company financing seller's
receivables. Despite the reference to a way of receiving delivery, the court ruled
that July 16, 1982 was the date of the repudiation. The date of the repudiation
was important as buyer was claiming that its damages for the repudiation could
be set off against some $76,105 it owed seller on prior contracts. Buyer received
notice of the assignment of the accounts receivable to Barclays on July 28,
1982. 200 Had the buyer used a U.C.C. section 2-609 demand on July 16, 1982,
197. U .C.C. § 7-301 ( 1) states: "A consignee of a non-negotiable bill who has given value in good
faith ... may recover from the issuer damages caused by ... non-receipt ... of the goods." This
section contains an exception not significant in the case being discussed. The implication is: no value
given, no recovery. But, if risk of loss passes, the contractual obligation to pay becomes fixed and so
would be value.
198. 476 So. 2d at 765, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 135-36.
199. 697 S.W.2d 694, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 706 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
200. This was by letter. 697 S.W.2d at 696, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 709. The court said that
the primary issue was whether the buyer's setoff was good against the assignee of the wood products
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thirty days would not have expired until August 15, 1982, and the repudiation
and consequent setoff would not have occurred before receipt of the notice of the
assignment. Thus, the appellate court found no error in the trial court's finding.
Indeed, in a footnote, 201 the court said that even if the statement about talking
to the vice president was notice of an assignment, it came after the statement
that the plant was closed. Hence, the repudiation would still have occurred
before the account debtor received notice of the assignment.
Interestingly, the court relied on the timing of the repudiation as a breach and
did not rule on the effect of a promise, stipulated to have been made, to give the
buyer sixty days notice before shutting down the plant, which also occurred on
the same day as the conversation about no more deliveries. 202
In T& S Brass & Bronze Works v. Pie-Air, Jnc.,2°3 fortunately no great issue
hung on when breach occurred. Pie-Air was the seller in a case involving the
third delivery of allegedly nonconforming goods under an installment contract.
Pie-Air attempted to claim buyer's repudiation by reason of a letter that
summarized a conference three days before and said that "we [T & SJ would be
happy to take the parts provided they passed inspection" and added that
"'T&S' could not make any further payments to Pie-Air until such time as this
entire matter is cleared-up." The court upheld (as not clearly erroneous) the
magistrate's conclusion that these sentences, in context, constituted only a
demand for assurances. 204 Thus, factual issues seem inevitable in anticipatory
repudiation cases.

Impossibility and Frustration
There was both good news and bad news this year for those seeking excuse
based on impracticability under U.C.C. section 2-615.
First the good news. Two cases excused sellers under U.C.C. section 2-615.
In Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers, 205 the mechanical subcontractor
(Waldinger) on a water treatment facility construction project sued its supplier
of sludge dewatering equipment (Ashbrook) for breach of contract. Ashbrook
company's receivables, i.e., that the right to set off "ripened" before receipt of notice of the
assignment. Cf U.C.C. § 9-318.
201. 697 S.W.2d at 700 n.3, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 714 n.3.
202. Barclays, on appeal, argued that the 60-day notice promise did not constitute a contract
because there was no consideration to support the promise. Thus, by finding it unnecessary to decide
whether the evidence supported the trial court's findings, the court chose to prefer an anticipatory
repudiation over a present breach to support its affirmance.
203. 790 F.2d 1098, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 433.
204. Id. at 1194, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 441. Universal Builders Corp. v. United Methodist
Convalescent Homes, 7 Conn. App. 318, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 763 (1986), is a
similar case. Roof trusses were to be supplied on a continuous basis. When deliveries were slow,
buyer wrote the seller saying, among other things, "Unless a minimum of 200 trusses are delivered
by July 5, 1983, you may consider your order cancelled." Id. at __ , 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at
765. The court interpreted this not as a repudiation, but as a request for assurances. By not giving
such assurances, the seller repudiated, but at a date 30 days later.
205. 775 F.2d 781, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 172 (7th Cir. 1985).
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defended on the ground that its performance had been made impracticable by
the project engineer's arbitrary interpretation of the contract specifications.
Waldinger also sued the project engineer. Before Ashbrook bid on the project, it
knew that the project engineer might not approve the machine it intended to
use. Ashbrook also signed a purchase order prepared by Waldinger stating that
the machine would be subject to the project engineer's approval and that the
machine would be "in strict accordance" with the specifications. When Ashbrook failed to perform, Waldinger had to cover at an additional cost of about
$370,000. At trial, Waldinger prevailed against the project engineer, but Ashbrook was excused for impracticability. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
on the impracticability question (Judge Pell dissenting) and remanded the
question of the project engineer's liability for reconsideration in light of case law
decided after the trial court's judgment. Perhaps the decision on the impracticability question can be explained upon the ground that on remand Waldinger
will almost certainly recover damages from the project engineer.
The second case is Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada)
Ltd. 206 Here the parties, both international dealers in agricultural commodities,
made three contracts for fixed quantities of "1980 crop U.S. runner split
peanuts." The seller (Gibbs) was unable to perform fully because extensive
drought in the peanut growing areas had reduced the crop. The seller prorated
and eventually delivered eighty-seven percent of the contract quantity. It would
have cost the seller $3.8 million to purchase peanuts to fulfill the remainder of
its obligations under the contracts; yet, seller's net worth was only $2.4 million.
Further, the seller had anticipated a profit of only $18,000 on the Alimenta
contracts. On these facts, the trial court excused the seller under U.C.C. section
2-615. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. This court (and the parties)
appear to have treated the contract as one stipulating an agreed source ("1980
crop U.S. runner split peanuts") that had partially failed, thus, permitting the
seller to allocate. 207
In two cases, buyers sought excuse from long-term installment contracts that
had become burdensome because of changed circumstances. In both cases, the
courts refused to excuse. The first case was Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
v. Carbon County Coal Co. 208 In 1978, when oil prices were high, a utility
company entered into a twenty-year contract for 1.5 million tons of coal per
year. The price was fixed subject to escalation. The court noted that the utility
company entered into a contract fixed as to both quantity and price rather than
a requirements contract because it was eager to have an assured source of lowsulphur coal. With falling oil prices in the early 1980s, the contract had become
206. 802 F.2d 1362, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 490 (11th Cir. 1986).
207. Another case involving the failure of an agreed source of supply was Selland Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. King, 384 N.W.2d 490, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 463 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (seller excused under U.C.C. § 2-615 from performance of contract for sale of school
bus bodies that seller was to obtain from specified manufacturer, who subsequently went out of
business).
208. 799 F.2d 265, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1505 (7th Cir. 1986).
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expensive relative to the utility company's other alternatives for obtaining
electricity. The Indiana Public Service Commission, which regulated the utility
company's rates, declined to permit the utility company to continue to pass that
expense on to its customers. The utility company then ceased to purchase coal
under the contract. The seller obtained a preliminary injunction requiring the
utility company to continue buying coal. After a jury trial, the seller won a
judgment of $181 million. On appeal, Judge Posner, writing for the court,
affirmed the trial finding that the utility was not excused from its obligations
under the contract.
In the second case, Scullin Steel Co. v. Paccar, /nc., 209 the buyer sought excuse
from its obligations under a two-year (later extended to four-year) contract to
purchase a fixed monthly quantity of railroad "car sets" because the buyer's
market for railroad cars had evaporated. The trial court refused to excuse the
buyer. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. This case is a good
example of explicit risk allocation. The appellate court stressed that the seller
wanted (as the buyer knew) a long-term contract in which the buyer guaranteed
to take delivery so that the seller could obtain financing to make capital
improvements to its plant. Thus, the seller proposed a contract stipulating that
it could not be cancelled by either side. The buyer responded with a clause
permitting it to withdraw from the contract should it cease manufacturing rail
cars, but the seller refused to agree to such a clause. Eventually, the buyer
signed the contract with the noncancellation clause. Under the circumstances, it
is apparent that the buyer assumed the risk that its market might disappear. 210

REMEDIES
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance
Central to a buyer's right of rejection or revocation of acceptance is the
statutory mandate that the relevant intention must be communicated to the
seller. 211 Oda Nursery v. Garcia Tree & Lawn, /nc. 212 provides a lesson on the
need to make explicit that the goods are no longer wanted. That case involved
the purchase of spreading juniper plants. Following their receipt by the buyer,
the plants were inspected but were not removed from their shipping containers
until planted some four months later. When sued for the purchase price, the
buyer argued that the plants were root-bound and had been rejected shortly
after delivery. Relying on the testimony of one of the buyer's employees that she
had immediately notified the seller that the plants did not look "up to snuff,"
the trial judge found a timely and effective rejection.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. The court felt that the
statement of the employee was insufficient to put the seller on notice that the
209. 708 S.W.2d 756, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
210. The court also addressed an issue concerning computation of the seller's lost profits under
u.c.c. § 2-708(2).
211. See U.C.C. §§ 2-602, 2-608.
212. 103 N.M. 438, 708 P.2d 1039, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 163 (1985).
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plants were being rejected or that their acceptance was being revoked. 213
Furthermore, the court found the notice lacking under U.C.C. section 2-605
because the employee did not mention the plants' deteriorating or root-bound
condition.
The result is correct but the court's reference to section 2-605 is puzzling.
Because notice to the seller of a breach is required even if the buyer wishes to
retain the goods, 214 it is logical to impose on the buyer a further obligation to let
the seller know if the goods are not wanted. In the absence of a request by the
seller, however, specificity of defects is needed only to enable the seller to
exercise its right of cure. 215 Nowhere in its opinion does the court explain its
apparent assumption that that right existed.
On the subject of notice, uncertainty exists as to whether it must be given in
writing to be effective. Although the Code's definition of notice 216 would seem to
allow oral notice and nothing in article 2 suggests otherwise, some courts have
held that a written communication is essential. 217

Reclamation
The intermesh of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) 218 and state law continues
to be the subject of frequent litigation. Consider, for example, the recurring
efforts of unpaid sellers to reclaim goods that are subject to the lien of a secured
party who financed the inventory of the debtor. The vast majority of courts hold
that the unpaid seller's right of reclamation under U.C.C. section 2-702 is
subordinate to the interest of a secured party (as a good faith purchaser) in those
same goods. 219 Not willing to concede the worthlessness of a subordinated
reclamation right, sellers have now begun to seek solace in Bankruptcy Code
section 546(c)(2), which authorizes substitution of an administrative expense
claim or alternative lien for the claim of a right of reclamation.
213. The court stated that even if the plants had been effectively rejected, their subsequent
planting was an act of dominion inconsistent with the seller's ownership, thus amounting to a
reacceptance. Id. at 442, 708 P.2d at 1043, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 168-69. The court also rejected
the buyer's contention that its answer, filed as part of the lawsuit, was a sufficient notice of
revocation of acceptance. As a matter of law, the court concluded that notice given approximately
one year after delivery of the plants is clearly unreasonable. Id.
214. See U.C.C. ~ 2-607(3)(a).
215. The seller's limited right to cure a defective tender is found in U.C.C. § 2-508.
216. U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
217. American Fast Print Ltd. v. Design Prints, 288 S.C. 46, 339 S.E.2d 516, 42 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1294 (Ct. App. 1986). The court felt constrained to rule as it did by that state's
supreme court opinion in Southeastern Steel Co. v. Burton Block & Concrete Co., 273 S.C. 634,
258 S.E.2d 888, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1151 (1979). The need for written notice was
squarely rejected in Badger Produce Co. v. Prelude Foods Int'l, 130 Wis. 2d 230, 387 N.W.2d 98, 1
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 422 (Ct. App. 1986).
218. 11U.S.C.§546(c) (Supp. III 1985).
219. Although involving the respective rights of unpaid cash sellers and a secured creditor, In re
Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on reh'g en bane, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), is considered the landmark case upholding the priority of the
secured creditor.
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In In re Misco Supply Co., 220 the district court held that the unpaid seller was
entitled to an administrative priority or a lien on all of the debtor's unencumbered assets. Recognizing that application of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)(2)
depends upon a right of reclamation under state law, the court reached the
dubious conclusion that although "subject to" the secured party's interest, the
right of reclamation, nevertheless, continued to exist. 221 It is difficult to understand the court's logic. It makes little sense to compensate a seller for a right
having no value and, by so doing, give that seller more than it would been
entitled to in the absence of a bankruptcy. Fortunately, not all courts have been
so magnanimous. 222
Finally, courts continue to grapple with the question of whether the drafters
used "insolvency~' in Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) in the sense in which it is
used in l!.C.C. section 2-702, 223 or in the sense in which it is generally used in
the Bankruptcy Code. 224 Authority for either position is growing. 225

Buyer's Money Remedies
The proper measure of damages for breach of the warranty of title was
considered for the first time by a Maryland court in Metalcraft, Inc. v. Pratt. 226
The case arose out of the sale of a marine hardware casting business. As things
turned out, the seller did not own a number of marine hardware casting
patterns it purportedly sold, leaving the buyer little choice but to return these
items to their respective owners. The trial court awarded as damages the value
of the patterns at the date of dispossession. The buyer asserted, however, that
U.C.C. section 2-714(2) was controlling and that damages should be measured
by the "difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had . . . as warranted." 227

220. 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1662 (D. Kan. 1986).
221. District Judge Kelly distinguished the present case from one where the right of reclamation
is lost as a result of the debtor's sale of the goods to a good faith purchaser. If the right of
reclamation is lost, then there is no right to priority treatment under§ 546(c)(2). Id. at 1667.
222. See In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 Bankr. 907, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
185 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (if secured party's lien precludes reclamation there is no right to
alternative relief); In re FCX, Inc., 62 Bankr. 315, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1193
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986) (same).
223. See U.C.C. § 1-201(23): "A person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts in
the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the
meaning of the federal bankruptcy law."
224. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (Supp. III 1985): "[A]n entity other than a partnership" is
insolvent if "the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property."
225. Compare In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 56 Bankr. 899, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Bankruptcy Code definition is controlling) with In re AIC
Photo, Inc., 57 Bankr. 56, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 90 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (the
U.C.C. definition should be applied).
226. 65 Md. App. 281, 500 A.2d 329, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 14 (1985).
227. U .C.C. § 2-714(2). According to the buyer, the value of the patterns when accepted was
zero because the seller did not qwn them. Thus, the buyer claimed damages in an amount equal to
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Therefore, the point of contention was over whether the buyer should be
permitted to enjoy the use of the patterns without any offset for depreciation.
On appeal, the appellate court held that the measure of damages selected by
the trial court was correct. Notwithstanding case law supporting the buyer's
position 228 and uncertainty among scholars concerning the applicability of
U.C.C. section 2-714(2) to a breach of warranty of title, 229 the court thought the
section "plain and unambiguous" and manifesting a legislative intent that it
apply to all breaches of warranty under the U.C.C. 230 The court next turned to
the question of whether there were "special circumstances" to take the case out
of the ordinary U.C.C. section 2-714(2) rule. 231 Because the buyer had use and
possession of the unique patterns for varying periods of time before title defects
surfaced, the court concluded that the case did fall within tile special circumstances clause of U.C.C. section 2-714(2) and that only the measure of damages
selected by the trial court would give the buyer the benefit of its bargain without
overcompensation.
At issue in "one of the longest relative to the stakes" lawsuits, 232 was a
disappointed buyer's duty of mitigation. In Cates v. Morgan Portable Building
Corp.,233 the buyers, owners of a motel, ordered portable buildings that would
add ten rooms to the motel. The buildings were delivered in defective con~ition
in September 1970. The seller made feeble attempts at repair until March 1971.
Suit was filed in August 1971. In September 1973, the parties agreed that the
seller would again try to repair the rooms. Between that date and April 1975,
intermittent attempts at repair were made but without success. The rooms were
finally put into working order by the buyers, at their own expense, sometime
after April 197 5. The trial judge awarded lost profits for two periods: Septemberl, 1970, to September 30, 1971, and September 11, 1973, to April 30, 1975.
The court denied lost profits for the intervening period, October 1, 1971, to
September 10, 1973, because the buyers had failed to mitigate their damages.
In an opinion heavily laden with common law references, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. Writing for the court, Judge Posner agreed with the

the value of the patterns at the time of the sale. 65 Md. App. at 291, 500 A.2d at 335, 42 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 19.
228. See, e.g., Murdock v. Godwin, 154 Ga. App. 824, 269 S.E.2d 905, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 572 (1980).
229. The court cited several scholars who argue that U.C.C. § 2-714(2) is irrelevant to breach of
warranty of title claims. 65 Md. App. at 292, 500 A.2d at 335, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 19 (citing R.
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-714:26 (3d ed. 1983); 2 A. Squillante & J. Fonseca,
Williston on Sales§ 16-8(2) (4th ed. 1974)).
230. Id. at 293, 500 A.2d at 336, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 20-21.
231. The measure of damages provided by U.C.C. § 2-714(2) was never intended to be an
exclusive measure. That same subsection permits use of an alternative formula if "special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
232. This was Judge Posner's characterization of the case, which, when he authored the court's
opinion, was in its fifteenth year of life. Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683, 685,
42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 451, 452 (7th Cir. 1985).
233. Id.
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trial court that although the U.C.C. imposes a duty to mitigate, 234 that duty was
suspended when the seller promised to fix the homes shortly after they were
delivered. 235 This suspension ended, however, at the expiration of a reasonable
period of time after April 1971, when it first became clear that the seller would
not make the necessary repairs. Judge Posner was unwilling to say that the trial
court's "guess" that six months was a reasonable period .was clearly erroneous. 236 Therefore, it was not until October 1971 that the buyers had to take steps
to mitigate their losses. This duty was again suspended from September 1973 to
April 1975, when the buyers were once more led to believe that the seller would
remedy the situation. The court squarely rejected the buyers' argument that a
duty of mitigation never arose because the seller always had an equal opportunity to mitigate. As the court saw it, recognition of a so-called equal opportunity
doctrine is "discordant with common law principles, which demand a reason for
not letting losses lie where they fall." 237 In particular, the doctrine would take
from buyers the incentive to cut losses even though the buyer can do so more
efficiently than the seller.
U.C.C. section 2-718(1) provides that "[d]amages for breach by either party
may be liquidated in the agreement." The parties are warned, however, that not
every liquidated damages provision will be acceptable. If it is a "penalty" it is
void. 238 To be labelled nonpenal, the liquidated amount must be "reasonable in
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining
an adequate remedy." 239
Whether the agreed upon formula met this standard was the issue before the
Ninth Circuit in California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc. 240 The
buyer, an agricultural cooperative in the business of transporting raw sugar
from Hawaii to California, ordered an oceangoing barge for delivery no later
than June 30, 1981. The parties agreed that the seller would pay, as liquidated
damages, the sum of $17 ,000 per day should delivery be delayed. The barge was
234. See U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1.
235. On this point, the court stated that "the seller may not insist on mitigation when by its
words or deeds it has led the buyer to believe that it has assumed what would otherwise be the
buyer's burden of mitigation." 780 F.2d at 687, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 454.
236. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's ruling that under Illinois law the
burden of proof on the issue of mitigation rested with the buyers, but it thought the error harmless
since allocation of the burden did not seem to affect the trial judge's decision. Id. at 688, 42 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 455-56. Although one other case decided during this survey period reached a similar
conclusion, see Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch, 229 Cal. Rptr. 261, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1531 (Ct. App. 1986), not all courts place the burden of proof on the mitigation of
damages issue on the breaching seller, see, e.g., M.K. Metals, Inc. v. Container Recovery Corp., 645
F.2d 583, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 487 (8th Cir. 1981); Cargill, Inc. v. Fickbohm, 252
N.W.2d 739, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1226 (Iowa 1977).
237. 780 F.2d at 689, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 457.
238. U.C.C. § 2-718(1): "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty."
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. 794 F.2d 1433, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1211 (9th Cir. 1986).
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not delivered when promised and liquidated damages grew to the not insignificant sum of approximately four million dollars. Although the provision was
admittedly reasonable when the contract was negotiated, the seller claimed it
was operatively a penalty when, as things turned out, the net actual loss
sustained by the buyer was $368,000. 241
Looking to Pennsylvania law for guidance, 242 the Ninth Circuit thought that,
despite the statutory disjunctive for testing the validity of the provision, state
courts would take into account equitable considerations along with the difficulty
of establishing actual damages if the clause was rejected. But this professed
willingness to read U.C.C. section 2-718 in light of common law principles
proved to be of no help to the seller. In the end, the court was swayed by the
relative sophistication of the parties and its belief that "[c]ontracts are contracts
because they contain enforceable promises, and absent some overriding public
policy, those promises are to be enforced." 243 The district court's judgment
upholding the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision was affirmed
in all respects.
In Frank B. Bozzo, Inc. v. Electric Weld Division of the Fort Pitt Division of
Spang lndustries, 244 the Pennsylvania Superior Court was called upon to decide
whether a buyer is entitled to have tacked on to its judgment interest from the
date on which the contract was breached. The seller contended that such
recovery is unavailable where the amount of damages occasioned by the breach
was, before judgment, neither liquidated nor ascertainable. The court disagreed.
In its opinion, the award was not interest but rather "compensation for delay"
measured by the legal rate of interest. 246 As such, it is an appropriate item of
incidental damages under U.C.C. section 2-715 if necessary to put the buyer in
"as good a position as if the other party had fully performed." 246 The court
offered the illustration of a buyer unable to earn interest on money that had to
be spent to meet the expenses incident to the seller's breach. 247 The court then
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the circumstances
warranted an award of compensation for delay.

241. The anticipated damages were based on expectations of rotting sugar and sugarless
customers if the barge could not be used to transport the sugar from Hawaii to California.
Substantial losses were avoided only because the buyer succeeded in finding other shipping.
242. The contract made Pennsylvania law controlling, presumably because the seller's principal
place of business was in Pennsylvania.
243. 794 F.2d at 1438, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1218. The buyer also claimed that it suffered
$3,732,000 in lost charter revenues. The trial court made no finding on this claim and the Ninth
Circuit was apparently under the impression that the exact loss, if any, would be difficult to prove.
What effect the presence of this claim had on the outcome of the case is difficult to measure. See id.
at 1439, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1219.
244. 345 Pa. Super. 4~3, 498 A.2d 895, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 213 (1985).
245. Id. at 431, 498 A.2d at 899, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 218. The court refused to decide
whether this distinction is of any significance.
246. The quoted portion in the text is that part of U.C.C. § 1-106 that the court found
persuasive.
247. 345 Pa. Super. at 430, 498 A.2d at 898, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 216.
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The superior court was correct in its observation that at times full compensation cannot be had without delay damages. But if full compensation is the goal,
should not the recovery be measured by the rate of interest the buyer would
otherwise have received rather than what will often be a lower statutory rate of
interest?

Seller's Money Remedies
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co.,2 48
discussed several questions pertaining to a seller's U.C.C. section 2-706 right to
resell goods (that are the subject of a breach) at a private sale and recover the
difference between the resale price and the contract price. In August 1980, the
parties entered into a contract for the sale of timber with an agreed upon
delivery date of "1980." In October 1980, the buyer, without justification, sent a
letter to the seller unequivocally cancelling the contract. Suit soon followed. In
its answer, the buyer alleged only that seller was under a duty to mitigate its
damages. The seller responded by selling the timber to five different purchasers
at private sales. The major thrust of the buyer's argument, rejected by the trial
court and asserted on appeal, was the seller's failure to give the statutory
mandated "reasonable notification of his intention to sell." 249
First, the court held that because notice of intent to sell is part of the seller's
prima facie case, the buyer is not required to plead lack of notice as a defense. 250
It then concluded that neither the filing of the complaint nor the buyer's
knowledge that the goods would be sold can substitute for the statutory notice. 251
Despite the seller's nonentitlement to damages under U.C.C. section 2-706, the
court affirmed on the basis of U.C.C. section 2-708( 1). 252 By concluding that the
resale price sufficed as proof of market price, the court was able to alter the
measure of damages but not the result. 253
The case nicely illustrates the remedial flexibility of the U.C.C. No election
of remedies is required and the aggrieved party may freely assert alternative
measures of damages. But one party's flexibility can easily become a trap for the
other. The party in breach must be always alert to the different potential uses of
the same evidentiary fact.
Because the Code provides alternative measures of damages, it is inevitable
that the aggrieved party will claim the applicability of the measure that provides
the highest award. The extent to which a seller is permitted to pick and choose

248. 104 Wash. 2d 751, 709 P.2d 1200, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 202 (1985).
249. u.c.c. § 2-706(3).
250. 104 Wash. 2d at 757, 709 P.2d at 1204, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 206.
251. Id. at 758, 709 P.2d at 1204, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 207. The court was careful to limit its
decision to the form of complaint before it. The complaint made no mention of an intention to resell
but sought only damages for breach. Id.
252. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) establishes damages by computing the difference between the market
price and the contract price.
253. 104 Wash. 2d at 758, 709 P.2d at 1205, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 208.
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was before the court in Union Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co. 254 The
case involved a contract for the purchase of large quantities of residual fuel oil.
·The seller, Union Carbide, planned to obtain the oil from Petrosar Limited and
resell to Consumers at a price computed on the basis of the amount paid to
Petrosar. As a result, Union Carbide was guaranteed a fixed profit on each
barrel of oil that Consumers accepted. Subsequently, there was a sharp drop in
the market price of the oil, which, because it was not passed on to Consumers,
prompted Consumers to refuse further deliveries.
Crucial to a determination of the extent of Consumers's liability was which
subsection of U.C.C. section 2-708 controlled. Atypically, it was the seller,
Union Carbide, who argued for application of subsection (1 ). A market price
differential measure of damages would yield the hefty sum of approximately
$120 million, whereas the profit actually lost on account of the breach amounted
to a mere $30 million. Relying on the remedial policy expressed in U.C.C.
section 1-106, 255 the court ruled that the reference in the preamble to subsection
(2) to the "inadequacy" of subsection (1 )'s damages formula was intended to
include cases of overcompensation as well as undercompensation. 256 Emphasizing the limited applicability of the decision, the court held that where, as here,
the seller acts as a middleman who assumes no risk of price fluctuations and the
buyer proves that market price damages will result in overcompensation,
damages should be calculated under U.C.C. section 2-708(2).
Although the result seems sound, the court can be faulted for its failure to
recognize the true problem. U.C.C. section 2-708(1) was never intended to
apply and its use, therefore, is never appropriate where the seller has never
acquired the contract goods. 257
Although the U.C.C does not expressly recognize a seller's right to recover
consequential damages, 258 such a recovery is possible if the "lost profit" language of U.C.C. section 2-708(2) is liberally applied. In Rogerson Aircraft
Corp. v. Fairchild lndustries, 259 the seller agreed to manufacture component
parts for an aircraft being developed by the buyer. Following the buyer's
wrongful termination of the contract, seller sought recovery for lost profits,
including what it claimed to have lost as a consequence of being shut out of the
existing aftermarket for spare parts and profits it would have earned on
prospective parts supply contracts with third-party aircraft manufacturers.
Quite clearly, both claims are essentially for consequential damages. Neverthe254. 636 F. Supp. 1498, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
255. U.C.C. § 1-106 states: "The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered."
256. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) is applicable only "[i]f the measure of damages provided in subsection
(1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done."
257. The formula of U.C.C. § 2-708(1) is premised on the ability of the seller to recoup a
portion of its loss by making a substitutionary disposition of the contract goods. This is, of course,
impossible if, at the time of the breach, the seller has not yet put itself into position to resell the
goods.
258. U.C.C. § 2-715 only addresses the buyer's right to incidental and consequential damages.
259. 632 F. Supp. 1494, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1512 (C.D. Cal. 1986).

U.C.C. Survey: Sales

1255

less, only the latter was denied, not because of its basic nature, but because
damages of this sort were unforeseeable and too uncertain for computation.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Past years provided no shortage of cases dealing with the time of accrual of a
cause of action for breach of warranty, and this year proved to be no exception.
The basic rule of U.C.C. section 2-725 is that the cause of action accrues and
the limitatiol}s period begins to run "when tender of delivery is made." 260 What
of the buyer who is unlucky enough to discover the defect after suit is timebarred under this basic rule? The answer in most cases is that he is without a
remedy, that is, unless the buyer can show that the warranty "explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance." 261 If it does, then the statute of limitations begins to
run "when the breach is or should have been discovered." 262 Unfortunately, the
difference between ordinary warranties and "future performance" warranties is
frequently difficult to discern.
In Safeway Stores v. Certainteed Corp., 263 a roof, which the seller advertised
as "bondable up to 20 years," first began to leak seven years after it was
completed. Two years later, suit was filed. Both the trial court and the court of
appeals ruled that the buyer's actjon was barred by the four-year limitations
period as suit was brought nine years after the roof was delivered.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court concluded that although an
implied warranty cannot explicitly extend to future performance, 264 an express
warranty, quite clearly, can. It remanded the case for a determination of
whether the ambiguous warranty, "bondable up to 20 years," is an explicit
reference to future performance. 265 Similarly, representations made in connection with a twenty-year bond required rejection of a motion for summary
judgment and raised a question of fact as to whether there was a "prospective

260. u.c.c. § 2-725(2).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 710 S.W.2d 544, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1237 (Tex. 1986).
264. The bulk of case law is in accord on this point. Courts reaching a similar conclusion during
this survey period include: Britt v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 637 F. Supp. 734, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1554 (D.D.C. 1986); City of Carlisle v. Fetzer, 381 N.W.2d 627, 42 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1676 (Iowa 1986); Allan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 221 Neb. 528, 378
N.W.2d 664, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 873 (1985).
In a concurring opinion, Justice Robertson took exception to this commonly held view because
"[u]nder § 2-725 the extension to future performance, not the warranty, must be explicit, whether
the warranty arises expressly or by implication." 710 S.W.2d at 549, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at
1244.
265. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wallace asserted that this phrase does not create a future
performance warranty but is an unambiguous statement that the roof is "capable of being bonded
for a period of up to 20 years." Id. at 551, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1246 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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warranty," i.e., a type that need not necessarily be all that explicit about future
performance. 266
As an alternative to a future performance warranty, buyers often seek to
extend the limitations period by arguing that the seller is for some reason
estopped to raise the statute as a defense. As was pointed out in last year's
survey, these arguments are rarely successful. 267 In Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v.
Budd Co., 268 the buyer of trailers asserted that the seller was equitably estopped
from pleading the statute because of (i) its attempted repairs and (ii) its delivery
of a letter two years after the trailers were delivered, in which the seller gave
assurance that it would stand behind its product. The trial court rejected buyer's
argument. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, it held that the district
court's finding that the letter was not an unconditional promise to repair was
not clearly erroneous. Next, it emphasized the complete absence of evidence that
the buyer was lulled into inaction by either the letter or the attempted repairs.
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 269 joins with the cases holding U.C.C. section
2-725 applicable to warranty claims involving personal injury. Recognizing the
possibility that the statute could bar a suit even before the injury occurs, the
Wyoming Supreme Court nevertheless thought that the plain la.nguage of
U.C.C. section 2-725 and the discernable legislative intent 270 command the
conclusion that the type of damages claimed has no operative effect on the
statute's scope. A reading of the opinion gives the impression that the court
might have ruled the way it did because it believed its decision to be of little
practical importance. As the court observed, an injured party "can still bring an
action in either negligence or strict liability within four years after the injury ."271 Unfortunately, this sort of reasoning only continues to foster the often
artificial distinction between tort and contract.
The division of authority on whether U.C.C. section 2-725 is controlling
when the action is for indemnity is further reinforced as more courts are called
upon to decide the issue. 272
266. Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (C<jllaghan)
462 (Del. Super. 1985).
267. 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 1, at 1392-93.
268. 796 F.2d 720, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1234 (4th Cir. 1986).
269. 716 P.2d 334, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1668 (Wyo. 1986).
270. According to the court, "If the Wyoming legislature did not intend the UCC's explicit
statute of limitations to apply to ... actions involving tortious injury or damage, then it could have
said so in the same manner as have many other state legislatures." Id. at 339, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
at 1673-74. For a discussion of the statutory diversity and a listing of precede!lt, see id. at 338 n.4,
42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1672 n.4.
271. Id. at 339-40, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1674-75. Wyoming's basic tort statute is four years.
Wyo. Stat.§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1977).
272. Compare Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1480, 1 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 775 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (a claim for indemnity based on breach of warranty is
governed by U.C.C. § 2-725) with Wingo v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 638 F. Supp. 107, 1 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389 (W.D. Va. 1986) (implied contract of indemnity is outside the
U.C.C. and not governed by U.C.C. § 2-725). It is interesting to note that, in Richardson, the court
found a "future performance warranty" even though the basis of the indemnity claim was breach of
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BULK TRANSFERS
The revision of article 6 is still under active consideration as Professor Steven
Harris details in his discussion of the "new approach" immediately following
this portion of the 1987 Annual Survey. 273
Sbar's, Inc. v. New Jersey Art & Craft Distributors274 again indicates the
need for a new approach for the buyer at a bulk sale who has not sent the
necessary notices. The case was complicated by the bankruptcy of the debtor
and the fact that the bulk sale buyer had paid the consideration into the
bankruptcy court pursuant to an order of that court. The bankruptcy court paid
the moneys out in satisfaction of an IRS lien and administrative expenses, but
the state court noted that there were insufficient moneys left to answer the
claims of unsecured creditors.
Plaintiff sued the bulk sales purchaser in the state court and was awarded the
full amount of its claim. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed 275
but required the trial court to determine the fair value of the property transferred. The court reasoned that the "defendant may be ordered to satisfy the
debt ... only to the extent of the fair value of the goods transferred," 276 with
credit for all payments made by the trustee in bankruptcy to creditors through
the bankruptcy court and pursuant to its order. Presumably this would include
the administrative expenses.
On one score, the buyer who fails to give notice is subject to liability if the
resulting appraisals show he made a good bargain even though it was not good
enough to result in a fraudulent conveyance. 277 But at least one other creditor is
suing the buyer, and in a footnote the court carefully expressed no opinion as to
how the proceeds should be divided. But should the rp.atter be left to state law
when a bankruptcy has intervened? Should not recovery, if any, go to the
trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of all creditors? 278
There were no other cases of sufficient interest under article 6.
an implied warranty. The reason was the presence of an express statement in the contract making
the term of implied warranties coextensive with that of the 10-year express warranty.
273. Harris, The Article 6 Drafting Committee's New Approach to Asset Acquisitions, infra.
There appears to be considerable opposition to the proposed approach.
274. 205 N.J. Super. 516, 501 A.2d 560, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 535 (App. Div.
1985).
275. The court stated that the bulk purchaser was not discharged by payment into the
bankruptcy court. The discharge unoer N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 12A:6-106(4) (West Supp. 1986) operates
"only where the consideration is paid jnto the County Court and written notice thereof by certified
or registered mail is given to the creditors. Defendant has not satisfied either of these conditions."
205 N.J. Super. at 518, 501 A.2d at 561, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 536.
276. 205 N.J. Super. at 518, 501 A.2d at 561, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 536.
277. Indeed, if not sold for a "reasonably equivalent value," would not the proper claimant be
the bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) as the debtor was
insolvent on the date of the transfer and filed one month thereafter? Would not a payment to a
successful plaintiff in a state court also be a preference? Id. § 547. The transfer is "on account of an
antecedent debt," it would seem. Id. § 547(b)(2) (1982).
278. While the cause of action is vested in the creditor, not the debtor, the payments are clearly
for debts of the bankrupt.

1258 The Business L'!wyer; Vol. 42, August 1987

DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
Two cases under article 7 discussed the effect in bankruptcy of a warehouseman's lien under U.C.C. section 7-209 where a warehouseman fails to issue a
warehouse receipt covering the stored property.
In Cataldo v. Casey b Hayes, Inc. (In re Knoware, Inc.), 219 one week before
it filed for bankruptcy, the debtor had the warehouseman move and store a
portion of its personal property. A warehouse receipt covering the goods was not
mailed to the debtor until after the debtor had filed for bankruptcy. The
warehouseman asserted a li~n on the stored goods for moving and storage
charges, and the bankruptcy trustee challenged the validity of the lien on the
ground that no warehouse receipt had been issued before bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy court ruled for the trustee under subsection 545(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 280 The 'court reasoned that since U.C.C. section 7-209 creates a
lien on "goods covered by a warehouse receipt" and since U.C.C. section 1201 ( 45) defines a warehouse receipt as an "issued" receipt, the lien under
section 7-209 is dependent upon the issuance of a warehouse receipt. The court
further held that "issuance" required mailing of the receipt. Since the warehouseman proved only that an envelope containing the receipt had been placed
in the warehouseman's outgoing mail bin and not that the envelope had been
deposited in the U.S. mails, the court held that there was no evidence that the
warehouse receipt had been mailed before bankruptcy. 281 Therefore, the warehouseman had no lien under U.C.~. section 7-209 valid against the trustee in
~~~.

'

In re Charter Co. 282 concerned a similar dispute in bankruptcy. In that case,
the debtor oil company made contractual arrange~ents with the warehouseman
for storage of its petroleum products inventory. Inventory was being constantly
added to and sold from the inventory stored with the warehouseman, who kept
records of inventory receipts and disbursements and rendered monthly inventory
statements. When the debt9r filed' for bankruptcy, the warehouseman claimed a
lien for various charges under U.C.C. section 7-209. The debtor challenged the
validity of the lien, and tjle court rule~ for the debtor. It found that the lien was
279. 57 Bankr. 163, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 998 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
280. Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part:
T~e trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the extent
that such lien-

(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement of the case against a
bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the commencement of the case,
whether or not such a purchaser exists ....
11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (Supp. III 1985).
281. Testimony by a competent witness that it was office custom for an employee to retrieve
envelopes from the outgoing mail bin and deposit them in the U.S. mails might have sufficed to
prove that the receipt had been mailed. See Leasing Assocs. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174
(8th Cir. 1971) and authorities cited therein.
282. 56 Bankr. 91, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 280 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
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not perfected and, thus, voidable under section 545(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The court held the issuance of a warehouse receipt by a warehouseman to be a
condition to the existence of· a lien under U.C.C. section 7-209. It then
concluded that the various inventory records were not warehouse receipts for
two reasons: (i) They did not contain certain terms required by U.C.C. section
7-202(2); and (ii) some of the documents had not been issued as required by
U.C.C. section 1-201 ( 45 ).
Both of these cases hold that a warehouseman does not have a lien on stored
goods under U.C.C. section 7-209 that is valid in bankruptcy if the warehouseman does not issue a warehouse receipt covering the goods. 283
These cases are correct as far as they go. They do not preclude the warehouseman from prevailing in bankruptcy on a theory of common law warehouseman's lien. At common law, the warehouseman had a possessory lien on
stored goods. The lien was specific, that is, it was only for charges on the stored
goods and not for charges on other transactions with the bail or. 284 Yet, the lien
conferred no right to sell the stored goods to satisfy the lien; the warehouseman
merely had the right to keep the goods until he was paid. 285
The sections in the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act ("U.W.R.A.") governing the warehouseman's lien (upon which U.C.C. section 7-209 is based)
were not expressly premised upon the issuance of a warehouse receipt. These
sections made the common law lien general286 and added a right of sale 287 but did
not otherwise displace the common law lien. 288 In the same fashion, U.C.C.
section 7-209 does not expressly displace the common law lien. Nor does the
drafting history of that section indicate such an intention; rather, the intention
was to expand the coverage of the common law lien. 289 Although even the
earliest draft of this section expressly presumed the issuance of a warehouse
receipt, 290 there is no mention of the reason for this change from the U.W.R.A.
in any of the notes or comments to the section. Probably the reason is that the
drafters intended the article 7 refinements of the common law warehouseman's
lien to apply only if a warehouse receipt were issued. Absent such a receipt, the
drafters probably would have agreed that the common law lien survived. 291

283. See also Richwagen v. Lilienthal, 386 So. 2d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Dathar Corp.
v. Lemkin, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
284. 1 L. Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Liens 981-1002 (3d ed. 1914).
285. Id. at 990-91.
286. Unif. Warehouse Receipts Act§ 27, 3 U.L.A. 139 (1959).
287. Id.§ 33, 3 U.L.A. 152.
288. State v. Amarillo Transfer & Storage Co., 94 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); cf
Jewett v. City Transfer & Storage Co., 128 Cal. App. 556, 18 P.2d 351 (1933).
289. A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Commercial Code, Tentative Draft No. I-Article VI,§ 13 (Apr.
19, 1948), reprinted in 4 A.L.I. & N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code-Drafts§ 13, at 239,
& note, at 262-63 (Kelly ed. 1984 ).
290. Id.
291. Cf 1 A.L.I. Proceedings, 26th Annual Meeting 81 (1949) (colloquy between Messrs.
Flory, Schnader, and Pepper).
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This result accords with reason. Certainly a creditor cannot claim that the
lien is secret. The warehouseman's possession of the stored goods is sufficient to
put creditors of the bailor on notice. 292 The issuance of a warehouse receipt to
the bailor does not further the policy of notice to creditors. Thus, the failure to
issue a warehouse receipt should not invalidate an otherwise valid common law
warehouseman's lien.
The assertion of a common law lien would probably allow the warehouseman
to prevail against the trustee in bankruptcy. Generally, common law possessory
liens are respected in bankruptcy. 293 Thus, had the warehousemen in Cataldo
and In re Charter Co. asserted common law lien rights, they might well have
prevailed.
This is not to say that there is no reason to issue a warehouse receipt. Good
business practice would dictate that. Further, if no receipt is issued, U.C.C.
section 7-210, which permits the warehouseman to sell the goods, is inapplicable. This remits the warehouseman to his limited common law rights as they
may have been supplemented by non-Code statutes.

292. Cf U.C.C. § 9-305 (possession of goods perfects security interest).
293. 48 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 1007, n.19c (14th ed. 1978).

